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EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Michael Farbiarz*
Over and over again during the past few decades, the federal government has
launched ambitious international prosecutions in the service of U.S. national
security goals. These extraterritorial prosecutions of terrorists, arms traffickers,
and drug lords have forced courts to grapple with a question that has long
been latent in the law: What outer boundaries does the Constitution place on
criminal jurisdiction? Answering this question, the federal courts have crafted
a new due process jurisprudence.
This Article argues that this jurisprudence is fundamentally wrong. By implicitly constitutionalizing concerns for international comity, the new due process
jurisprudence usurps the popular branches’ traditional foreign relations powers. And in the name of protecting defendants’ presumed interests, the new
due process jurisprudence may end up badly undermining them by incentivizing a turn to harsher, alternative national security measures—drone strikes,
for example, and military detention in Guantánamo Bay. Moreover, because
of certain structural features of the international law enforcement system, U.S.
courts have applied the new due process jurisprudence generally—perhaps
even exclusively—in precisely that class of cases to which it should not be
applied.
None of this needs to be. Borrowing from choice-of-law doctrine, I argue that
a coherent due process jurisprudence would focus solely on the unfairness, if
any, that flows from actual conflicts between federal criminal law and the
local criminal law of the place where the defendant acted. A due process jurisprudence reformulated to focus on actual conflicts protects both the liberty of
criminal defendants and global public safety.
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Introduction

American lawyers know all about the limits the Constitution places on
jurisdiction in civil cases, like Pennoyer v. Neff1 or International Shoe.2 But
constitutional limits on criminal jurisdiction have been much more obscure.
This is because, for most of the nation’s history, criminal prosecutions have
been purely local affairs. When New York prosecutes a New York resident for
a crime she committed in New York, questions of jurisdiction can be taken
for granted; they do not warrant attention. But no longer. Over and over
during the past few decades, the federal government has launched ambitious
international prosecutions in the service of U.S. national security goals—
prosecutions of terror leaders operating in Pakistan or Libya, of notorious
global arms dealers working in Russia or Spain, and of violent drug lords
based in Afghanistan or Colombia. These extraterritorial prosecutions seek
to hold defendants accountable for their actions abroad, wholly outside the
sovereign territory of the United States. And they force us to ask and answer
a fundamental question that has long been latent in the law: Namely, what
are the outer boundaries that the Constitution places on criminal
jurisdiction?
To answer this question, the lower federal courts have spent decades
crafting a sprawling new due process jurisprudence, which allows a federal
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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criminal law to reach extraterritorial conduct only if that conduct has a connection or “nexus” to the United States. And at first glance, this new jurisprudence seems sensible. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has
long required what amounts to a nexus.3 In particular, before state civil law
is permitted to reach extraterritorial conduct—before, say, the tort law of
Minnesota is allowed to reach a car accident in Wisconsin—due process requires a connection between the source of the law (Minnesota) and the
event in question (the accident).4 And leading scholars have argued that
there is no reason not to subject federal criminal law to these same due
process limits.5
I argue, however, that the new due process jurisprudence that has been
developed in the criminal context is fundamentally wrong. It is only in extremely rare cases that due process, properly understood, requires a nexus to
the United States as a predicate to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. As
things stand, though, due process is generally—if not exclusively—being
brought to bear in precisely that class of cases to which it should not be
applied. The real world costs of this are severe. Forcing the United States to
forego major extraterritorial prosecutions harms global public safety. And in
the name of protecting defendants’ presumed interests, the new due process
jurisprudence may end up badly undermining them, by incentivizing a turn
to harsher, alternative national security measures—drone strikes, for example, and military detention in Guantánamo Bay. This Article argues that
none of this is necessary. A coherent due process jurisprudence protects
both the liberty of criminal defendants and U.S. national security.
Due process generally limits the law’s extraterritorial reach for two reasons. The first is a concern for intergovernmental structure, for keeping sovereigns from interfering with each other. The second is a concern for
protecting individual defendants from unfairness.
As I argue, the first concern, for intergovernmental relations, cannot be
used to justify due process limits on the extraterritorial application of federal
criminal law. Structural concerns about what will or will not lead to a rupture between national governments have long been understood as ultimately
the province of the popular branches, not the courts. These structural concerns should not be implicitly constitutionalized—by transposing them into
a due process jurisprudence whose purpose is to limit the popular branches
and, if necessary, to override their decisions. Moreover, the Constitution already fixes the boundaries of federal law’s reach—in Article I. And so there
is no reason to press due process into service. Indeed, the Supreme Court

3.
4.
5.
Process,

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1223–39 (1992).
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has suggested, if only indirectly, that doing so would be improper.6 Structural concerns, in sum, cannot provide a basis for due process limits on
extraterritorial prosecutions.
This leaves fairness concerns. Fairness in this context means upsetting
the defendant’s expectations of the substantive law that she thought would
apply to her conduct. Such an upending of expectations occurs only if there
is a meaningful discrepancy—a conflict—between the U.S. criminal law the
defendant is prosecuted under and the law that she expected would apply,
the law of the place where the crime was committed.
When such a conflict exists, whether as to substantive criminal law or as
to sentencing law, an extraterritorial prosecution should indeed be permitted to go forward only if there is a “nexus” to the United States. In the
absence of such a conflict, there is no cognizable unfairness. In that circumstance, the federal government should be permitted to prosecute a defendant
without any regard for the nexus that her conduct has to the United States.
Some countries might object to such prosecutions—and I might, too. But
protecting against international frictions is a matter for Congress and the
President, not the stuff of judicially imposed constitutional constraints.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I introduces the new due process
jurisprudence that the courts have developed to restrain federal extraterritorial prosecutions. Part II argues that concerns for the structure of the international system cannot undergird that jurisprudence—which leaves
concerns for preventing unfairness as the jurisprudence’s sole predicate.
Reasoning from civil choice-of-law cases, Part III demonstrates that in
the context of extraterritorial prosecutions, unfairness, properly understood,
principally inheres in legal conflicts. The most pointed of these are “actual
conflicts,” in which the conduct that is the basis for the U.S. extraterritorial
prosecution was legal under the law of the place where it was committed.
Part IV shows that any unfairness caused by requiring a foreign defendant to
stand trial in the United States should not be understood to trigger the due
process protections at issue here. Doing so would collapse an important distinction in the law of jurisdiction—in the teeth of generations of Supreme
Court admonitions to the contrary. Part V shows that there are, in fact, no
(or virtually no) extraterritorial prosecutions that involve actual conflicts.
This means that due process jurisprudence—which under current law is
brought to bear across the board, to nearly all extraterritorial prosecutions—is being routinely applied to the very class of cases to which it should
have no application, cases in which there is no actual conflict. Part VI concludes by demonstrating that a reformulated due process jurisprudence, focused tightly on actual conflicts and sentencing conflicts, protects public
safety and national security and helps to ensure that defendants are treated
fairly.

6. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (rejecting the application of substantive due process to excessive force claims against law enforcement because the Fourth
Amendment contains an “explicit textual source of constitutional protection”).
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* * *
The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in a series of major
extraterritorial prosecutions that turned on the new due process jurisprudence.7 But that cannot last forever. The constitutional and practical stakes
of these sorts of cases are too high. And some of the most challenging cases
for the new due process jurisprudence are now winding their way through
the lower courts.8 The time for a systematic and critical assessment of due
process’s work is now, and it is to that assessment that I turn.
In doing so, I operate against an increasingly rich scholarly backdrop. As
extraterritorial prosecutions have surged, legal scholars have begun to produce landmark works on criminal jurisdiction and its limits, generally about
questions of statutory interpretation or the reach of various Article I powers.9 No article in this area is more important than Extraterritoriality, published in 1992 in the Harvard Law Review by Professors Brilmayer and
Norchi. Extraterritoriality argues that there is no reason why constitutional
limits on state law should not be applied to federal law,10 and in doing so it
has implicitly supplied the theoretical basis for current due process jurisprudence. But there are deep gaps in Extraterritoriality—and these gaps, developed below,11 together constitute the reasons why due process jurisprudence
cannot be understood as animated by a concern for safeguarding the structure of the international system.
Some of the more recent scholarship in this area represents the first
stirrings of a new school of thought with respect to criminal jurisdiction.
This emerging school of thought brings to bear the insights of civil choice of
law, and seeks to differentiate between criminal laws that clash with other
countries’ criminal laws and those that do not.12 This Article builds on that
work. The new scholarship suggests that, at least in some cases, there is less
7. E.g., Yousef v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 248, denying cert. to 750 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2014); Al Kassar v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2374 (2012), denying cert. to 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2011).
8. See, e.g., Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ahmed, No. 12-661 (S-1) (SLT)
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012), 2012 WL 6721134. The three non-U.S. citizen defendants in Ahmed
were charged with providing material support to an African-based terrorist organization,
based on training in Africa for anticipated combat in Africa. Mosi Secret, Three Men Appear in
Court in Mysterious Terror Case, N.Y. Times (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
12/22/nyregion/3-men-accused-of-training-with-al-shabab-appear-in-new-york-court.html
[http://perma.cc/FZB4-FTN3].
9. See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 843 (2007); John H. Knox, A Presumption
Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am. J. Int’l L. 351 (2010); Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the
Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 1191 (2009); Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1673 (2012).
10. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at 1230–31.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 Va. L.
Rev. 1019, 1103–10 (2011); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 Notre Dame L.
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unfairness involved in an extraterritorial prosecution when U.S. criminal law
and foreign criminal law do not conflict with one another.13 But it does not
ask and answer the critical question: whether that lesser degree of unfairness
is, nonetheless, sufficient to justify due process limits on federal law. This
Article answers that question and in the course of doing so provides the first
systematic study since Extraterritoriality of the due process limits on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
I. Extraterritorial Due Process
A. The Prosecutions
For generations now, the federal government has mounted extraterritorial prosecutions—prosecutions concerned with actions committed entirely
outside of the sovereign territory of the United States. These prosecutions
were initially rare and mainly focused on white-collar offenses.14 But starting
in the 1980s, extraterritorial prosecutions became more common and began
to focus on national security matters and narcotics crimes.15 That is the current state of play. There is, now, a steady drumbeat of extraterritorial prosecutions—targeting terror leaders, global arms traffickers, and violent drug
lords. The stakes of these prosecutions are like nothing else in the criminal
law. Extraterritorial prosecutions have, for example, culminated in the convictions of multiple terror operatives for their roles in killing 224 people on
a single day in East Africa.16 And in the context of extraterritorial narcotics
prosecutions, defendants have been convicted for selling staggering volumes
of cocaine,17 as well as surface-to-air missiles for shooting down aircraft.18
But it is not just the moral temperature of extraterritorial prosecutions
that sets them apart. It is also that such prosecutions are tools of U.S. national security policy, devices used to project American power abroad.19 U.S.
foreign policy, for example, has long focused on helping to shore up stable

Rev. 1057, 1113–15 (2009); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New
Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 110, 164–79 (2010).
13. E.g., Colangelo, supra note 12, at 1108; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits
on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law,
48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 121, 164–70 (2007).
14. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at 1223.
15. See id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279–80 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 2013); In re Terrorist Bombings of
U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 101–08 (2d Cir. 2008).
17. E.g., United States v. Suarez, No. 11 Cr. 836(KBF), 2014 WL 1998234, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2014).
18. E.g., United States v. Bout, 731 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Al
Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2011).
19. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at 1223; accord David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a
Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 1, 1–3 (2011).
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and legitimate government in Africa.20 Much of that effort is military, diplomatic, and financial. But part of that effort also runs through extraterritorial
prosecutions—which have targeted battlefield leaders who make war on African governments21 and senior African leaders who terrorize their people22
or violate international norms.23 Similarly, after the United States committed
to using all instruments of its power to check Iranian weapons procurement,24 a cascade of extraterritorial prosecutions has followed, focused on
Iranian efforts to obtain prohibited items.25 To cite a final example, many
major drug traffickers have been extradited from Colombia for prosecution
in the United States.26 Any of these men could have been prosecuted in Colombia, which outlaws cocaine selling just as the United States does. But
local Colombian prosecutions of powerful drug barons would have come at
the cost of deepening the motive of narcotics traffickers to make war on the
Colombian government—to kill local police, bribe prosecutors, kidnap government ministers, secretly bankroll politicians who might one day offer
amnesty, mount jailbreaks, and generally continue guerilla fighting, in the
hopes of seeing jailed comrades one day freed.27 U.S. extraterritorial prosecutions have incapacitated drug lords without these costs being borne by the
sometimes-fragile Colombian state—and these prosecutions have accordingly served the United States’ larger goal of propping up Colombia in its
long battle against narcotics traffickers.

20. E.g., Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive on Sub-Saharan Africa (June 14,
2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2Q7S-BN9P].
21. Affirmation of Benjamin Naftalis at 3–4, United States v. Warsame, No. 1:11-cr00559 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (describing defendant leading hundreds of fighters in battle on
behalf of group at war with Somali government).
22. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793–800 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing torture
of Liberian civilians by senior Liberian government official).
23. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Arrests of Drug Kingpin Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, the Former Head of the Guinea-Bissau
Navy, and Six Others for Narcotics Trafficking Offenses (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/April13/GuineaBissauArrestsPR.php?print=1 [http://perma.cc/52UFFHVX] (describing prosecution of a senior Guinea-Bissau government official for large-scale
narcotics offenses in Guinea-Bissau).
24. Colin H. Kahl et al., If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed
Iran, Center for a New American Security, 7–9, 11 (2013), http://www.cnas.org/sites/
default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_IfAllElseFails.pdf [http://perma.cc/VP4N-LHG4].
25. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/nsd/pages/attachments/2015/01/23/export-case-list-201501.pdf [http://perma
.cc/YPT5-5GDW] (listing prosecutions).
26. E.g., U.S. Sec’y of State, Report on International Extradition, at tbl.B (Jan. 17, 2001),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/16162.htm [http://perma.cc/WA5F-TLYB].
27. See Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw 61–201 (2001).
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B. The Deep Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Contemporary extraterritorial prosecutions, as set out above, stand
alone. But they also raise a basic legitimacy question: Is it permissible for a
foreign citizen who commits a crime in her country to be subjected to U.S.
criminal law? This question concerns the “first and fundamental question[,]
. . . that of jurisdiction.”28 But for all the attention paid to jurisdiction, its
domains have not been fully mapped. Judicial jurisdiction is the power of a
court to hear a case.29 Due process limits that power—as in cases like Pennoyer v. Neff30 and International Shoe.31 Legislative jurisdiction is different.
Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a sovereign to prescribe substantive
rules to govern a situation.32 Due process limits that power, too—as in doctrines of constitutional choice of law.33
But all of this relates to civil cases, not criminal ones. Indeed, criminal
jurisdiction is a backwater; the study of jurisdiction typically ignores criminal cases, and the study of criminal cases usually ignores jurisdiction.34 This
makes sense—or once did. In the Anglo-American tradition, criminal cases
were long regarded, in Justice Story’s phrase, as “altogether local, and cognizable and punishable exclusively in the country[ ] where they are committed.”35 A crime was understood to have been committed in one place and to
be prosecutable “exclusively” in that place.36 And because courts apply only
the criminal law of the place where they sit,37 there was a seamless web: the
crime was committed in one place; it had to be tried in that place; and the
28. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Great S. Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1998)).
29. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 401(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
30. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
31. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 401(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
33. E.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814–23 (1985) (imposing due process limits on state’s extraterritorial application of its substantive law); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326–31 (1981) (plurality opinion) (same).
34. See John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 Geo. L.J.
1217, 1217 n.1 (1985); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State
Criminal Law, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 763, 767 (1960).
35. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 516 (Arno Press 1972)
(1834); accord Rafael v. Verelst (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 621 (KB) 622; 2 Black W. 1055, 1058
(“Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local.”).
36. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (requiring that “all criminal prosecutions” proceed in the
“district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). But cf. 3 A Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England 363 (J.H. Thomas ed.,
London, S. Brooke 1818) (discussing certain transitory crimes that could be tried anywhere in
England).
37. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 89, cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1971);
see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The Courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another . . . .”).
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criminal law of that place was applied at trial. The question of where the
crime was committed (often self-evident) determined where the case could
be tried, a question of judicial jurisdiction. And where the case could be
tried determined the substantive law that could be applied, a matter of legislative jurisdiction. There was not much to be said about criminal jurisdiction in part because it was thought to be simple. When a person robbed a
bank in Illinois, she had to be prosecuted in Illinois for violating Illinois
law—and that was that.38
No longer. The classic ideal of “local” prosecutions was not always followed—and it has been disintegrating for over a hundred years.39 But with
extraterritorial prosecutions, we are a world away from the idea that there is
only one body of criminal law that “exclusively” covers a given occurrence.
When U.S. criminal law reaches into another country, say Spain, law is
layered over law, creating redundancies (or, perhaps, conflicts); Spain has its
own criminal laws, and the United States is piling its law on Spain’s. This
creates a deep problem. On the one hand, contemporary extraterritorial
prosecutions raise difficult questions about jurisdiction—necessarily, by definition—not by the fluke of a bullet happening to fly across a border. But on
the other hand, in answering these modern jurisdictional questions, the old
answers will not do. This is because the necessary premise of today’s extraterritorial prosecutions, that multiple bodies of criminal laws apply to a single occurrence, is wholly at odds with Justice Story’s classic ideal of criminal
jurisdiction, that only one body of criminal law applies to a single
occurrence.40
38. There were of course occasional cases that entailed border crossing; a gun fired in
Massachusetts might kill a person in Connecticut. Even in those cases, though, the law was
concerned almost exclusively with the question of where the crime had been committed, where
its “gist” was. See Wendell Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 Mich.
L. Rev. 238, 239–44 (1931) (discussing the various legal fictions that courts used to reconcile
elements of a crime occurring in multiple jurisdictions); Rollin M. Perkins, The Territorial
Principle in Criminal Law, 22 Hastings. L.J. 1155, 1157–61 (1971) (discussing a restricted
application of the territorial principle in which the situs of a crime was where the actor’s
bodily movements “took effect”).
39. See Berge, supra note 38, at 248–59 (describing relevant history); Larry Kramer,
Comment, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1431, 1436–38 (1983)
(same).
40. To some, this basic contradiction may suggest that extraterritorial prosecutions are,
as a class, unlawful. But that argument is not available. Though they have become more common only recently, the Constitution envisions extraterritorial prosecutions. See U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . define and punish . . . Felonies committed
on the high Seas . . . .”); id. art. III, § 2 (describing venue rule when a crime is “not committed
within any State”). Indeed, the first federal criminal statute created certain extraterritorial
offenses, Crimes Act of 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, and courts have long held that “any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.” United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); accord Strassheim v. Daily,
221 U.S. 280, 284–85 (1911) (Holmes, J.). Note that these cases do not purport to consider
whether due process may limit the exercise of a sovereign’s criminal jurisdiction outside its
borders.
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C. The Extraterritorial Due Process Doctrine and Its Impact
The lower federal courts have stepped into this breach in cases like
United States v. Al Kassar.41 In that case, the lead defendant was a non-U.S.
citizen who largely acted in Spain.42 He was tried in the Southern District of
New York and convicted of various crimes related to conspiring to sell large
quantities of surface-to-air missiles to purported South American terrorists.43 The defendant argued that the application of U.S. criminal law to
him violated due process.44 Quoting the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 decision in
United States v. Davis,45 the Second Circuit rejected this claim: “[i]n order to
apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently
with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant
and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.”46
This Davis standard has been broadly influential. It is followed, as
noted, in the Second Circuit. It has generally been followed in the Fourth
Circuit47—which, along with the Second Circuit, has traditionally been the
venue for the nation’s most significant extraterritorial criminal prosecutions.
And the country’s largest circuit, the Ninth, generally hews to the “nexus”
standard as well.48
This Article refers to the dominant body of due process law that follows
Davis as the “extraterritorial due process doctrine.” And it bears emphasizing that the extraterritorial due process doctrine concerns legislative jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a sovereign (here, the United

41. 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011).
42. See Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 115–16.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 116–17.
45. 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (quoting Davis, 905 F.2d at 248–49).
47. See e.g., United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2009)
(applying Davis standard); see also United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 841–42 (E.D.
Va. 2011) (same), aff’d, 702 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F.
Supp. 2d 723, 727–28 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same). But see United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547,
552–54 (4th Cir. 2012) (not following prior Fourth Circuit law on this point).
48. See e.g., United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006). To be sure,
Davis has not been followed everywhere. In the D.C. Circuit, for example, the question
whether a “nexus” is required has not yet been reached and resolved. See United States v. Ali,
718 F.3d 929, 943–44 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And some other courts have suggested that due process
does not require a “nexus” to the United States. Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 Hastings Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 323, 359–75 (2012). But most of these cases come out of circuits that handle
only a small portion of major extraterritorial prosecutions. And, in any event, most of these
cases require something quite a bit like a “nexus,” though not in so many words. These cases
generally look to international law, and international law in this area “presupposes a nexus.”
Id. at 380.
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States) to prescribe the substantive rules that reach certain conduct.49 Criminal legislative jurisdiction is established if a criminal statute reaches certain
conduct and does not exceed the constitutional limit on legislative jurisdiction—such as the limits established by the extraterritorial due process doctrine, limits that are captured in the notion of a “nexus.”50
The extraterritorial due process doctrine has been in place now for
years, limiting virtually every extraterritorial prosecution.51 But for all its
ubiquity, the doctrine’s impact can be hard to see. Courts have struck down
only one prosecution for noncompliance with it.52 But this does not mean
the doctrine does not do important work. The extraterritorial due process
doctrine is no surprise hurdle, an impediment that unexpectedly looms up
at the last minute. Prosecutors know about the doctrine. If they believe that
they can satisfy its strictures by showing some connection between the defendant and the United States, they may go forward with a case. And if they
do not, they will not indict, and accordingly no effort will be made to bring
the defendant to the United States. There is, after all, no compulsion to
mount an extraterritorial prosecution.53 And no prosecutor wants to charge
a defendant and bring him to the United States for prosecution only to have
the case dismissed.54 The practical impact of the extraterritorial due process
doctrine is not mainly felt in cases that are dismissed pursuant to it. It is felt
in cases that are never brought—and that impact is no less important for
being hard to see.

49. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 401(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
50. The extraterritorial due process doctrine is not concerned with judicial jurisdiction.
Judicial jurisdiction is about the power of a sovereign’s courts to adjudicate a given case. See id.
§ 401(b). Judicial jurisdiction is generally thought to be established in criminal cases by the
simple fact that the defendant is physically present before the court. See infra note 216 and
accompanying text.
51. The doctrine may not apply to piracy cases. E.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709,
723–724 (9th Cir. 2008). But those cases are rare, and sui generis. W.E. Beckett, The Exercise of
Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners, Brit. Y.B. Int’l L., vol. 6, 1925, at 45 (“Piracy stands on
such an exceptional basis that it throws no light on the question of penal jurisdiction generally.”). Moreover, the doctrine may not apply to cases involving conduct on “stateless” ships
on the high seas. E.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 966–67 (9th Cir. 1995). But, again,
those are rare. This Article does not address these classes of cases, and it does not address
“stings”—undercover investigations in which government agents, it is sometimes charged,
function as agents provocateur. Those, too, raise their own issues.
52. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006).
53. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2566–67 (2004) (contrasting crimes, like locally committed murders, that
are “mandatory” and must be pursued, with discretionary investigations that federal prosecutors, “free agents,” are able to select and pursue).
54. Cf. Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 Me. L.
Rev. 131, 141 (2010) (describing “political traction” of claim that Guantánamo detainees
should not be brought to the United States for trial because of acquittal risk).
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D. The Theory of the Extraterritorial Due Process Doctrine
But what is the underlying theory of the extraterritorial due process
doctrine? The cases do not supply a ready answer. The Second Circuit first
articulated the “nexus” standard in United States v. Yousef; but it did so without explanation, based solely on citation to the Ninth Circuit’s Davis decision.55 Davis, in turn, tersely cited another Ninth Circuit case,56 which
simply cited three other cases.57 Two of those cases do not mention due
process.58 And one of the cases said that the question whether U.S. criminal
law applies abroad “would appear to have no constitutional implications.”59
But the case law’s silence is not surprising in the end. The Supreme
Court has not weighed in on whether due process limits the reach of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in criminal cases. But the Court has reached
related questions in civil cases. The leading case is Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague,60 a tort action that concerned a Wisconsin motorcycle accident. The
question was whether Minnesota tort law could be applied extraterritorially—across state lines—to control resolution of claims flowing from the
Wisconsin accident.61 To comport with due process, the Supreme Court established the standard of a “significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests,” so that application of Minnesota’s law to
the contract dispute would be “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.”62
Allstate and its progeny seem very clearly to undergird the extraterritorial due process doctrine.63 First, there are unmissable overlaps between due
process limits on civil legislative jurisdiction (as in Allstate) and due process
limits on criminal legislative jurisdiction (as in the extraterritorial due process doctrine). Allstate requires that the application of substantive law not be
55. 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49
(9th Cir. 1990)).
56. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)).
57. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493–94 (9th Cir. 1987) (first citing United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982); then citing United States v.
Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980); and then citing United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8,
10–11 (2d Cir. 1968)).
58. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. 449 U.S. 302, 305 (1981) (plurality opinion).
61. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 304, 307–08.
62. Id. at 312–13.
63. See United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727–28 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(noting similarity between the Davis “nexus” standard and Allstate). But cf. United States v.
Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 943–44 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s analogies to personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence while suggesting that courts have sometimes borrowed personal jurisdiction language in addressing extraterritorial due process claims).
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“arbitrary” or “fundamentally unfair”64—and so does Davis.65 Allstate requires some connection between the sovereign that seeks to apply its law
extraterritorially, and the conduct that is being regulated: “significant contact[s].”66 And Davis, under the banner of “sufficient nexus,” requires much
the same thing.67
More fundamentally, there is a deep structural similarity between the
factual scenarios of Allstate and Davis—between application of state law
(Minnesota tort law) across borders (into Wisconsin), and the application of
federal law (criminal law) across borders (internationally). Reasoning from
this similarity, Professors Brilmayer and Norchi argue that there is no satisfying reason why due process limits on the reach of state civil law should not
be understood to also limit the reach of federal law, civil and criminal.68
Their trailblazing article, Extraterritoriality, was present at the creation. Extraterritoriality applauded Davis.69 And Extraterritoriality was cited in the
opinion that enshrined Davis as Second Circuit law.70
II. Against Structure
As set out above, well-established due process limits on state civil legislative jurisdiction (as in Allstate) form the basis for due process limits on
federal criminal legislative jurisdiction (as in Davis)—and the bridge from
state civil cases to federal criminal cases was apparently built in part on the
strength of Extraterritoriality. But this Part argues that this civil-to-criminal
argument is not fully persuasive at a theoretical level. It is not right, as Extraterritoriality argues, that there are no bases for distinguishing between the
relevant types of cases, between state civil cases and federal criminal cases.
To begin unpacking these arguments, note that there is “universal[ ]”
agreement that, in civil cases like Allstate, two underlying concerns animate
the imposition of constitutional limits on extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction.71 The first is preventing unfairness to the defendant. Applying Minnesota tort law to a Wisconsin motorcycle accident may be unfair to the
defendant. And the second is avoiding friction between state governments.
Cross-border application of Minnesota law can cause domestic friction, between one state and another; Wisconsin might resent application of Minnesota law to an accident that happened in Wisconsin. And in some cases,
64. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
65. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
67. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248–49.
68. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at 1224–39.
69. Id. at 1253.
70. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 n.45 (2d Cir. 2003).
71. Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over
Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651, 651–53 (1987) (collecting numerous references); accord Willis
L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (1978).
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cross-border application of state law might cause international friction between a state and a foreign country; Canada, for example, might resent application of Michigan law to a motorcycle accident that happened in
Toronto. This Article refers to the problem of domestic or international intergovernmental friction as a “structural concern.”
These two concerns, fairness concerns and structural concerns, together
supply the underlying justification for imposing due process limits on extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in state civil cases. But this Part demonstrates that structural concerns cannot form part of the basis for due process
limits on extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction in federal criminal cases.
A. Internal Limits: Article I and Graham
Start with Professor Tribe’s distinction between “internal” and “external” limits on an entity’s power.72 An internal limit “inheres in the definition
of the power,” while an external limit is imposed on a power from outside of
it, limiting the scope that the power would otherwise have.73
For example, an entity might be granted the power to “operate nonsegregated schools,” in which case its ability to run segregated schools is
internally limited—by the terms themselves of the grant of power. Alternatively, another entity might be granted the power to “operate schools.” This
grant of power does not itself prevent the entity from running segregated
schools. This entity’s ability to run segregated schools would be limited, if at
all, only externally—by a later-enacted statute, for example, which is external to the grant of power itself.
External and internal limits are different strategies for limiting an entity’s power, and in the U.S. constitutional system, each kind of limit is classically associated with a different kind of entity. States are thought of as
entities with virtually no internal limits. They have broad “police power”—
to zone property or establish hospitals or punish muggings.74 Rather than
being internally constrained, limits on state power are typically of the “external” sort.75 The Clean Water Act76 is imposed from the outside, to limit
broad preexisting state power with respect to land use.77 Each state has wide
72. 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 794–95 (3d ed. 2000).
73. Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576, 578 (2014) (explaining Tribe’s dichotomy).
74. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (describing
the “general power of governing, possessed by the States . . . as the ‘police power,’ ” and noting
that, pursuant to this power, states “can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government,” including policing, education, and zoning).
75. E.g., id. (“The Constitution may restrict state governments—as it does, for example,
by forbidding them to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. But where such
prohibitions do not apply, state governments do not need constitutional authorization to
act.”).
76. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
77. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water
Act preempts state law that impedes federal efforts to eliminate water pollution or interferes
with its chosen methods of doing so).
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discretion to set economic policy, but the Dormant Commerce Clause is
externally imposed, to limit the state’s otherwise-extant power to take protectionist measures.78
Federal power, by contrast, is characterized by internal limits. This is
what it means to say that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers.79 Federal power is “defined[ ] and limited”80 on the front
end—from the get-go, under the very terms under which the power is itself
first granted. Built into the federal grant of Article I power to “establish a[ ]
uniform Rule of Naturalization”81 is a requirement that immigration laws be
“uniform.” The Article I power to “regulate Commerce”82 is limited by its
own terms to activities that, in some sense, concern “Commerce.”
There is, in short, a basic and familiar constitutional typology: external
limits constrain state power, and internal limits constrain federal power.83
And that is telling here. Structural concerns are about keeping power, state
or federal, in its proper lanes (whatever those lanes might be). How to accomplish this? State power is not generally checked by internal limits—indeed, in most circumstances it is not even clear that such limits would be
reasonably available. Therefore, to keep state power in its appropriate lanes,
there has always been a turn to external limits. The Clean Water Act and the
Dormant Commerce Clause are examples, as are the due process limits on
state legislative jurisdiction84 (and state judicial jurisdiction85) that are such a
well-established part of constitutional law.
But federal power is generally checked by Article I internal limits, and
there is, accordingly, no similar need to reach for an external limit like due
process. Think of United States v. Lopez,86 for example. In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a criminal statute because it was said to press out
beyond the horizon of the Article I power (the Commerce Clause) that Congress had relied on to pass it.87 Lopez curbed federal legislative jurisdiction
by reference to internal limits (the scope of the Commerce Clause) and not
by the imposition of external limits (like due process, which no one even
mentioned). This is typical. Federal courts routinely test the scope of federal
legislative jurisdiction against the scope of the Article I power under which
78. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1978) (establishing “a
per se rule” invalidating “simple economic protectionism” by states under the Dormant Commerce Clause).
79. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (providing a history of this idea).
80. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
82. Id. cl. 3.
83. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct at 2578.
84. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion).
85. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315–16 (1945).
86. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
87. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.

522

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:507

Congress passed the legislation in question—without reference to due
process.88
And this is as much the case for domestic federal statutes (as in Lopez)
as for extraterritorial federal statutes. Consider, for example, the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which permits federal narcotics prosecutions of people caught on non-U.S. ships even if they are thousands of
miles away from the United States.89 The Act is a bread-and-butter law-enforcement tool, especially in Florida, where it is often used to charge the
crews of boats stopped by the Coast Guard in the Caribbean.90 But in 2012,
in United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado,91 the Eleventh Circuit, which includes
Florida, vacated a series of MDLEA convictions on purely internal limits
grounds—because the MDLEA exceeded Congress’s Article I power under
the Law of Nations Clause.92 This approach is typical: courts routinely measure the scope of legislative jurisdiction in the context of extraterritorial federal prosecutions against the reach of federal Article I powers.93
This leads to a crucial point: whatever role structural concerns play with
respect to due process limits on state law, there is no reason to think that
structural concerns need to play that same role with respect to due process
limits on federal law. This is because, when it comes to federal law, structural concerns are already being addressed—the way they always have been,
without due process (or other external limits) being brought to bear, simply
by considering, as in Lopez or Bellaizac-Hurtado, the internal limits on federal power set out in Article I.94
88. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600 (2004); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
89. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508 (2012).
90. Kontorovich, supra note 9, at 1193.
91. 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012).
92. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1249–58 (construing the Law of Nations Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). The other circuit that sees frequent MDLEA prosecutions is the First,
which includes Puerto Rico. The First Circuit seems poised to rein in the MDLEA on internal
limits grounds. One influential First Circuit judge has pressed that position in a lengthy dissent. United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 739–51 (1st Cir. 2011) (Torruella, J., dissenting). The “force[ ]” of this position has been acknowledged by the First Circuit. Id. at 737
(majority opinion). But a case that presents the issue in a de novo procedural posture has not
yet come up. See United States v. Nueci-Peña, 711 F.3d 191, 198 (1st Cir. 2013); CardalesLuna, 632 F.3d at 737.
93. E.g., United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014) (measuring reach
of extraterritorial criminal statute against scope of Article I power under Piracies and Felonies
Clause); United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 551 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012) (same, Raise and Support Armies Clause); United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2011) (same,
Foreign Commerce Clause); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 804–09 (11th Cir. 2010)
(same, Necessary and Proper Clause); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir.
2006) (same, Foreign Commerce Clause); United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–08
(5th Cir. 2003); (same, Foreign Commerce Clause); see also United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
Supp. 896, 907 n.24 (D.D.C. 1988) (striking down various extraterritorial hijacking charges as
beyond Congress’s Article I powers).
94. Brilmayer and Norchi argue that there is no reason why state and federal law should
be treated differently from the perspective of due process limits on legislative jurisdiction.
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And the argument can be pressed further. Building on Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court has held that when “a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a
particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ”95 Under Graham, that an “explicit textual source” (say,
the Law of Nations Clause of Article I) speaks directly to the structural concerns that impact the extraterritorial reach of federal power means that the
“generalized notion” of due process cannot be invoked to deal with those
same structural concerns. Because Article I does structural work, due process cannot be pressed into service to do that same work.96
Moreover, it is clear that the spirit of Graham very much applies here.
Some have thought that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is too permissive such that Article I, as currently interpreted, does not limit federal legislative jurisdiction tightly enough.97 That concern certainly seems to have
influenced the lower courts in imposing due process checks on extraterritorial prosecutions.98 But it is one thing to argue that due process should be
poured into a given area because, otherwise, that area might be left empty—
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at 1224–40. But the argument in the text is one such reason.
That external limits (like due process) are necessary to curb state law does not mean that they
are needed for curbing federal law—where the bounds of legislative jurisdiction are already
policed, by the internal limits of Article I.
95. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); accord County of Sacramento v. Lewis ex rel. Estate of
Lewis 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998).
96. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). As a doctrinal matter, this argument is
not free from doubt. For example, the Supreme Court has not yet explained whether Graham
applies when the “explicit textual source” is Article I, not a constitutional amendment—
though it is hard to see why it should not. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7
(1997) (describing Graham as applying to “specific constitutional provision[s], such as the
Fourth or Eighth Amendment[s]” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the Court has not said
whether Graham applies only as a counterweight to the expansiveness of substantive due process—in which case it might not apply to due process checks on legislative jurisdiction. But
Graham does not seem confined only to substantive due process. See United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 50–51 (1993) (declining to apply Graham in a procedural Due Process case—but not suggesting that the principle does not apply, as a categorical
matter, in such cases). Rather, Graham appears to be an instantiation of the idea that the
specific trumps the general, see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting as much for four Justices), in which case it should apply in all Due
Process contexts.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Article I commerce power has been too permissively construed by the
Supreme Court); cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098–3012 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Article I Necessary and Proper Clause powers have been construed
too permissively by the Supreme Court).
98. For example, Judge Torruella’s concerns about the permissiveness of Article I, see,
e.g., United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 739–51 (1st Cir. 2011) (Torruella, J., dissenting); United States v. Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d 2, 20 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), appear to have led him toward embracing due
process limits on federal legislative jurisdiction. See Angulo-Hernández, 632 F.3d at 19.
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a law-free zone. It is another thing for the lower courts to import due process into an area because of a sense that the law that already occupies the
space, that the Supreme Court has laid down, is insufficiently protective. The
first motive seems permissible.99 The second is surely not, and that motive is
precisely the one that Graham nips in the bud.100
B. Criminal Law and the Popular Branches
As set out above, when it comes to federal law, Article I already addresses structural concerns, so there is no need to look to due process to
address them—indeed, under Graham, it would be improper to do so.101
These arguments explain why structural concerns should not, in general, be understood to animate due process limits on federal law. In this
Section, I develop more particularized arguments that point in the same
direction—that explain why structural concerns should not be understood
to undergird due process limits on federal criminal law, let alone due process
limits on federal criminal law that is applied extraterritorially.
Domestic and international cases involve different structural concerns.
In the domestic context (as in Allstate, when Minnesota law reached into
Wisconsin), the structural concerns that due process addresses are purely of
an interstate nature.102 They are a matter of “horizontal federalism”—of
keeping the states of the union in their proper lanes vis-à-vis each other.103
In the international context (as in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, when Texas

99. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843–45 (suggesting it is).
100. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
315–18 (1936), made the “remarkable claim that the [federal] foreign affairs powers are inherent and not dependent on enumeration [in the Constitution].” David M. Golove, Against FreeForm Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1791, 1906 n.347 (1998). This might suggest that the idea
of “internal limits” developed in the text has no traction here, because federal extraterritorial
power is not limited by the enumerated powers of Article I. But whatever might generally be
said about it, Curtiss-Wright has been rejected in this context across the board. The courts have
rejected it—testing extraterritorial statutes against the bounds of particular Article I enumerated powers, not an “inherent” powers concept. See supra note 93. Congress, too: extraterritorial criminal statutes have been enacted based on enumerated Article I powers, not “inherent”
powers. See, e.g., United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 551 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
the House cited several Article I justifications for the passage of the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act); United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining
that the House based its authority to enact the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act of
2002 on the Commerce Clause of Article I); Kent, supra note 9, at 861–64 (detailing a number
of recent congressional invocations of the Law of Nations Clause of Article I to support the
enactment of various pieces of legislation). And the executive has defended extraterritorial
statutes based on the reach of specific Article I powers, not based on “inherent” power; that is
clear from the reports of the cases collected above. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
103. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (2008) (describing horizontal federalism).
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law reached into Mexico),104 the structural concerns that due process addresses have nothing to do with horizontal federalism. Rather, they relate to
the relationship between a state (say Texas) and a foreign government (say
Mexico).105
Controlling intergovernmental friction between states and foreign governments is not a relatively major concern of the Constitution; it is not on
par with the Constitution’s concern for controlling friction between the
states. For example, New York must give full faith and credit to the judgments of Connecticut106 but not to the judgments of Canada or China.107
And this asymmetry is not particular to full faith and credit. Numerous constitutional provisions “are designed to foster national unity and to move
interstate relations away from the international model,” to “forbid[ ]” the
states from merely “treat[ing] each other like foreign countries.”108 But the
Constitution generally says very little about “the international model” itself,
about how states are to “treat[ ] . . . foreign countries.”
But if the Constitution has relatively less to say about state-foreign relations, it is closely focused on state-federal relations. The federal government—not the states—is in charge of the nation’s foreign relations.109 The
Constitution restrains the states internationally to protect this federal primacy, to leave ample room for the federal government to control the country’s external affairs.110
And this dynamic is in play with respect to due process. Due process
limits on state assertions of jurisdiction in the international realm are based
in substantial measure on the potential impact that such assertions of jurisdiction may have on the federal government’s ability to control the nation’s
external relations.111
104. 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930).
105. See Dick, 281 U.S. at 407–08.
106. U.S. Const. art. IV, §1; Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“Regarding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons
governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.”).
107. Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1531,
1552 n.161 (2011).
108. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 259–60 (1992).
109. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford
R. Clark, The Political Branches and the Law of Nations, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1795,
1801–02 (2010); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003); Crosby v.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383–86 (2000).
110. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371–74; see also, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450–51 (1979) (curbing international reach of state
law to permit the nation to “speak with one voice” abroad).
111. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (noting that “foreign governments’ objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the
past impeded negotiations of international agreements” by the federal government) (quoting
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-865), 2013 WL 3377321); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
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In sum, when state law is applied internationally, constitutional law—
including due process—is animated by structural concerns. But those structural concerns are less a general vision of the states’ proper relationship to
foreign countries, and more a matter of ensuring that state actions internationally do not impinge on the federal government’s control of the nation’s
external affairs.
But this structural concern with overinvolvement in foreign affairs bears
no weight when we move from state to federal law. While constitutional law
constrains state interference with the nation’s external relations, there is no
concomitant concern for federal “interference” with external relations. After
all, the federal government is supposed to be in charge of external relations.112 When state law reaches into the international arena, there is no reason to think that it reflects the preferences of the government in charge of
such matters, the federal government. But when federal law reaches internationally, we can be sure that at least one of the federal popular branches
considered such a possibility. Congress necessarily wrote and approved the
substance of the federal law. And Congress must have intended the federal
law to be applied abroad—otherwise the law cannot apply.113 From the perspective of structural concerns, due process limits on state law in the international realm are principally designed to ensure that the federal
government controls the nation’s external relations. But that goal cannot be
transposed to a rationale for due process limits on federal law.
The point is sharper yet when the federal law in question is federal criminal law. When federal criminal law is applied abroad, it is not at the behest
of a private plaintiff pursuing her own litigation interests, whatever the results on U.S. foreign relations might be. Rather, federal criminal law is applied at the behest of the federal executive branch—and that makes all the
difference. It is one thing for courts to worry about impacts on international
relations when private plaintiffs bring suit. In such private suits, someone
needs to guard the foreign policy interests of the United States.114 And as
between a private plaintiff and a court, the court is clearly better suited and
due process is a tool at hand. But there is no reason to think that courts are
better positioned than the federal executive branch, acting through its prosecutors, to make decisions about structural concerns, about what might upset
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (reversing state assertion of jurisdiction and noting
that a “careful inquiry” is necessary, one that assesses, among other things, “the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations policies”).
112. E.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 (describing “the Constitution’s allocation of the
foreign relations power to the National Government”).
113. E.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ ” (quoting E.E.O.C.
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
114. Cf. Doe VII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting in part) (describing recent objections by seven countries to extraterritorial application of a particular federal statute at the behest of private plaintiffs).
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the fine balances of give and take that mark the international system or what
might constitute an overreach in the context of it.115
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Pasquantino v. United States,116 which upheld a federal fraud prosecution that was
based on the allegation that the defendants had deprived a foreign government (Canada) of tax revenue by engaging in liquor smuggling. The Pasquantino Court emphasized that private suits are distinct from “a criminal
prosecution brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity.”117 And it
rejected the defendants’ argument that the prosecution would cause “international friction”:
This action was brought by the Executive to enforce a statute passed by
Congress. In our system of government, the Executive is the “sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations,” and has ample authority and competence to manage “the relations between the foreign
state and its own citizens” and to avoid “embarass[ing] its neighbor[s]”
. . . . . [W]e may assume that by electing to bring this prosecution, the
Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causing international friction. . . . The greater danger, in fact, would lie in our
judging this prosecution barred based on the foreign policy concerns animating the revenue rule, concerns that we have “neither aptitude, facilities
nor responsibility” to evaluate.118

This leaves very little room, if any, for courts to disapprove of extraterritorial
prosecutions because of a sense that they might cause intergovernmental
frictions between the United States and a foreign country.
And Pasquantino applies with greater force yet to the sorts of extraterritorial prosecutions we have been considering in this Article. It is tautological
that the federal prosecutors who handled the Pasquantino liquor-smuggling
prosecution were acting for the federal executive branch.119 But it is little
more than that. There was no suggestion in Pasquantino, save in a formal
115. It is telling that when a private plaintiff’s suit might raise foreign policy concerns, the
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the courts should look to whatever views about the
litigation that the federal executive might be willing to express. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); cf. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004)
(describing State Department’s filing of “statements of interest”). In a similar vein, the Court
has spoken of the need for “judicial caution” when it comes to creating a private right of
action under a federal statute—in part because creating such a right of action is tantamount
“to permit[ing] enforcement [by a private plaintiff] without the check imposed by
prosecutorial discretion.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–27.
116. 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
117. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 362.
118. Id. at 369 (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); then quoting Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir.
1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring); and then quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
119. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 123 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“When the United States prosecutes a criminal action, the United States Attorney
acts in the interest of the United States . . . .”).
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sense, that the prosecutors’ work affirmatively reflected the nation’s foreign
policy preferences. Indeed, if the Pasquantino prosecutors had been in touch
with senior political figures about foreign policy matters, that would have
been deeply unusual given the strict separation that is supposed to exist
between the Department of Justice and other parts of the federal
government.120
But these norms of deep separation do not apply with full force in major extraterritorial prosecutions.121 With respect to one African terror leader,
for example, there were dozens of meetings to decide whether to mount an
extraterritorial prosecution.122 The meetings involved the Department of
Justice.123 But the meetings were held at the White House, and some of the
most active participants seem to have been Pentagon and State Department
officials, and two of the President’s most senior staffers.124
As the Supreme Court suggested in Pasquantino, a liquor-smuggling
prosecution merits deference as the executive’s foreign policy choice.125 It
follows that more deference should be accorded when the United States
mounts a major extraterritorial prosecution, and the actual federal foreign
policy apparatus (including the President’s staff) is involved—and not just
career Department of Justice prosecutors who have been, for good reason,
intentionally hived off from the rest of the federal government. Major extraterritorial prosecutions are not like state law reaching abroad: potential impediments to the federal executive making foreign policy. They are the
federal executive making foreign policy. That the former are curbed by due
process does not suggest that the latter should be.126
And the argument goes further. U.S. foreign relations law routinely
seeks to address structural concerns in the international context by limiting
120. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Att’y General to Heads of Dep’t Components and
United States Att’ys [hereinafter Communications Memo] (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.justice
.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf [http://perma.cc/D7LV-JEXH] (setting out Department of Justice-wide policies). It was, in part, contacts between prosecutors
and senior executive branch figures that caused many observers to excoriate then-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, and that led to his forced resignation. Daniel Richman, Political
Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 Duke L.J. 2087, 2190 &
n.21 (2009). Gonzales’s successor immediately restored traditional (tight) restrictions on communications between prosecutors and others in the executive branch. See Communications
Memo, supra.
121. For example, then-Attorney General Mukasey’s December 2007 memo explicitly
specified that its strict limits on prosecutors’ communication with the White House did not
apply to national security matters. See Communications Memo, supra note 120, at 2.
122. Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the
Obama Presidency 237–63 (2012).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005).
126. This conclusion is, again, directly at odds with Extraterritoriality’s claim that there is
no basis for not transposing due process checks on state law into due process limits on federal
law, including federal criminal law applied abroad. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 5, at
1224–39.
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the reach of federal law. But it generally does so only as a second-best option—because the popular branches, charged with running U.S. foreign relations, have not yet spoken.127 Thus, for example, structural concerns are
the basis for restraining federal law from reaching foreign sovereigns, under
the sovereign immunity doctrine.128 But the executive branch can eliminate a
sovereign’s immunity.129 Structural concerns undergird the judicial presumption against extraterritoriality, but that presumption gives way when
the popular branches say so.130 Structural concerns prevent federal law from
reaching the actions of other governments, under the act of state doctrine.131
But Congress and the executive branch can together curb the act of state
doctrine, as they have.132 And structural concerns, grounded in international
law, are a basis for curtailing the extraterritorial reach of federal law, especially in commercial contexts.133 But the popular branches can override international law.134 In sum, courts have long invoked structural concerns to
limit the reach of federal law—but as a general matter only if the popular
branches have not yet addressed those concerns. Once the popular branches
have addressed these concerns, the courts’ ideas about international friction
are, at that point, no longer thought to be in play. This is because, as Justice
Jackson explained, judgments about foreign policy are “political, not judicial”; they are not backward looking (like most legal decisions), but rather
127. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations
Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395 (1999).
128. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004) (describing the
“comity” basis of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 134, 136 (1812), as
“the source of our foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence”).
129. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (collecting cases);
see also United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The Executive Branch
has not merely refrained from taking a position on this matter; to the contrary, by pursuing
[the defendant’s] capture and this prosecution, the Executive Branch has manifested its clear
sentiment that [the defendant] should be denied head-of-state immunity.”).
130. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664, 1668–69 (2013) (“The presumption against extraterritoriality guards against our courts triggering . . . serious foreign
policy consequences, and instead defers such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political
branches.”).
131. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) (“The principle that the
conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of
another . . . rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity . . . .”).
132. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012) (cutting back on the act of state doctrine by overruling
the specific holding of a then-recent Supreme Court act of state doctrine decision, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)); S. Rep. No. 1188, at 24 (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3829, 3852 (describing intent to do so).
133. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir.
1979) (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust, 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th
Cir. 1976)); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993).
134. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1963);
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815). It
bears noting that international law obligations may continue to apply as a matter of international law even after being superseded by U.S. domestic law.
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“involve large elements of prophecy.”135 “They are decisions of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”136
But due process limits on the international reach of federal law, if they
are understood as predicated on structural concerns, would go a long way to
undermining this architecture. As sketched out above, the settled understanding has generally been that constraints on federal law, to the extent that
they are based on structural concerns, can be undone by the popular
branches. But that would no longer be the case if those structural concerns
were somehow thought to be constitutionalized, to be instantiated in due
process itself.
To see the point, think of the United States’ 1989 invasion of Panama.
That invasion cost hundreds of lives and ended with Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega in custody in Florida, facing federal narcotics charges for conduct in Central America.137 Now imagine that Noriega had invoked due
process limits on federal legislative jurisdiction as a defense to the criminal
charges against him. And imagine further that due process limits on the
international reach of federal law were understood to be animated by structural concerns—by an understanding of what the United States’ proper relationship is with other countries in the international system, by a sense of
how much intergovernmental friction between the United States and other
countries is too much. If that were the case, there would be prosecutions, if
not Noriega’s then others, in which the popular branches of the federal government would say “this is fine from a foreign relations/international friction perspective”; where the court would say the opposite—and the court’s
view would prevail, as an expression of constitutional law that trumps the
contrary views of the popular branches.
Such a result would contradict centuries of long-established understandings reflected in the main lines of foreign relations law.138 And it would
require judges to enforce as law against the popular branches a particular
theory of how international relations are supposed to work, whatever that
theory might be—just as Lochner once required the courts to enforce a particular theory of economic and social justice.139 Due process does not enshrine judges’ ideas about the proper functioning of the international system
any more than it “enact[ed] Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”140 To
135. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
136. Id.
137. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 1997); see also John
Lindsay-Poland, Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama
118 (2003).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 127–136.
139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58–65 (1905).
140. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d 2,
20 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing concern
about an extraterritorial federal prosecution because “[t]he United States cannot be the
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again cite Justice Jackson, the “struggle” against “judicial supremacy”141 will
have been lost on an important front if due process is construed to give
courts—and not the President and the Congress—the final say over what is
or is not consistent with how the international system is supposed to work.
That would be to cede control over important portions of our national life
to unelected judges. And that would be an implication of deploying due
process to limit federal law on the basis of international structural concerns—not the common-law constraints of foreign relations law that can be
undone by the political branches; but the definitive constraints of constitutional law, that, in the end, trump them.
III. Fairness in Its Proper Place
Part II advanced the argument that structural concerns cannot form the
basis for due process limits on extraterritorial application of federal criminal
law. This is not the end of the matter, though, because a concern for fairness
is the other pillar of due process checks on legislative jurisdiction.142 But if
due process is to limit prosecutions solely to protect against unfairness, then
it of course follows that due process should be brought to bear only when, in
fact, some unfairness is present. There would be no reason to apply the
extraterritorial due process doctrine when the problem that it exists to solve
(unfairness) is, simply, not there.143
But what is unfairness in this context? And how much unfairness is
minimally sufficient to bring to bear the “nexus” test of the extraterritorial
due process doctrine? Section III.A below answers the first question, and
Section III.B answers the second one. The arguments developed in this Part
suggest that the extraterritorial due process doctrine should be very substantially reformulated—Section III.C explains how.
A. Actual-Conflict Cases and No-Conflict Cases
In the context of due process limits on legislative jurisdiction in civil
cases, fairness is a matter of protecting the defendant’s expectations.144 And
expectations’ domains are well-established—due process checks on legislative jurisdiction protect the defendant’s expectations about the body of substantive law that is ultimately to control her conduct.145
world’s policeman,” and “[i]f we continue to extend the natural borders of our national jurisdiction, we can expect others to do the same against us”).
141. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of Crisis
in American Power Politics (1941).
142. See supra text accompanying note 71.
143. The extraterritorial due process doctrine, exemplified in Davis, requires a “nexus” to
the United States. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48.
144. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317–18 (1981) (plurality opinion); see
also id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 337–38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
145. E.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (reversing application of
state substantive law because, “[w]hen considering fairness in this context, an important element is the expectation of the parties” and “[t]here is no indication that when the leases . . .
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To begin analyzing how this particular concept of fairness translates
here, imagine a U.S. prosecution of a Spanish citizen for actions she took in
Spain—and two possible variants on that hypothetical prosecution.
First, the actions the defendant took in Spain might have been lawful
under Spanish criminal law. In such a scenario, on the fundamental question whether certain conduct subjects the defendant to criminal liability, the
potentially relevant bodies of criminal law directly conflict with each other.
The defendant’s actions were legal under Spanish law. But they were illegal
under U.S. criminal law—which is how there can be a U.S. prosecution.
This is an “actual-conflict case.”146
Second, the actions the defendant took in Spain might have been unlawful under Spanish criminal law. In such a scenario, the potentially relevant
bodies of criminal law are in harmony; they do not conflict. The defendant’s
actions were illegal under Spanish law, and they were also illegal under U.S.
criminal law. I call this a “no-conflict case.”
In the actual-conflict case, a U.S. prosecution profoundly upsets the defendant’s expectations. The defendant expected that she was conforming her
conduct to the law—Spanish law.147 But, it turned out, she was breaking the
law—U.S. criminal law. In the no-conflict case, a U.S. prosecution does not
upset the defendant’s expectations in this particular way. The defendant
could not have expected that she was conforming her conduct to the law.
Her conduct violated Spanish criminal law, regardless of whether it also violated U.S. criminal law.
In actual-conflict cases, the application of U.S. law very deeply upsets
expectations. The defendant is surprised to know that her conduct is illegal,
and is also surprised to learn that she is subject to U.S. law. In no-conflict
cases, the defendant is not surprised that her conduct is illegal, only that she
is subject to U.S. law. Actual-conflict cases involve relatively more unfairness; no-conflict cases involve relatively less.148
This actual conflict/no conflict typology is familiar. Indeed, assessments
of whether there is a conflict between two potentially applicable bodies of

were executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would control”); Allstate, 449 U.S. at
312–13 (noting that due process measures the constitutionality of applying “a State’s substantive law”).
146. As to the term “actual conflict,” see infra note 149.
147. The background assumption is of course that people generally believe that their conduct is governed, at least, by the law of the place where they act.
148. The most pointed kind of actual conflict is one in which the defendant is prosecuted
in the United States for actions that were not only lawful where she acted—but that local law
required her to take. So far as I know, though, nothing like this has come up in an extraterritorial federal prosecution—though an analogous situation sometimes comes up in civil cases.
E.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958) (reversing dismissal of civil action for noncompliance with discovery
order when complying with order would have required the plaintiff to violate Swiss criminal
law).
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substantive law are at the heart of the modern jurisprudence of civil legislative jurisdiction.149
B. The Constitutional Necessity of a Threshold Conflict
As we saw above, unfairness in the context of due process limits on
legislative jurisdiction means the upending of a defendant’s expectations
about the substantive law that she thought would control her conduct.150
This upending of expectations is especially pointed in an actual-conflict
case. The defendant thought she was following the law and turns out to have
been breaking it—and is now being prosecuted for that surprising lawbreaking. There is little doubt that the extraterritorial due process doctrine
should apply in a prosecution that involves an actual conflict—and that such
a prosecution should therefore have to satisfy the doctrine’s requirement of
a “nexus” to the United States. The problem that the extraterritorial due
process doctrine exists to solve (unfairness, in terms of upset expectations) is
emphatically present in an actual-conflict case.
But no-conflict cases are different. The defendant knew that she was
violating the criminal law, but did not know that, in addition to violating
local criminal law, she was also violating U.S. criminal law. This is a less
dramatic upending of expectations. The question, then, is this: If it is to be
understood as based solely on fairness concerns, is there enough unfairness
in the no-conflict scenario to justify application of the extraterritorial due
process doctrine? This Section argues that the answer is largely “no.” Section
III.B.1 begins with due process limits on legislative jurisdiction in civil cases.
Such limits, I show, are triggered only when there is an actual conflict—
between one body of substantive law that might apply and another. Section
III.B.2 argues that, before applying due process limits, it makes as much
sense to require a threshold actual conflict in criminal cases as it does in civil
cases.151 Section III.B.3 goes further, explaining that there are stronger reasons to require an actual conflict in criminal cases than in civil ones. Section
III.B.4 shows that requiring a threshold actual conflict would bring the extraterritorial due process doctrine into line with fair-warning law—a closely
related due process doctrine that also requires an actual conflict, though not
in so many words. Section III.B.5 broadens the argument, showing that due
process protections should also be triggered when there is a “sentencing conflict”—a discrepancy between how a defendant is to be sentenced under U.S.
law and how she might otherwise have been sentenced.
149. In civil cases, a conflict between two bodies of substantive law has long been called an
“actual conflict.” Because I use a similar concept, to similar effect, with respect to criminal
cases, I use that same term: actual conflict. Note that I am not the first person to analyze
criminal cases with respect to actual conflicts: Professor Colangelo’s important work has been
trailblazing. Colangelo, supra note 12, at 1103–1109; Colangelo, supra note 13, at 165–74.
150. See supra Section III.A.
151. This civil-to-criminal analogy is not perfect. See supra Section I.B. But reasoning
from civil cases to criminal ones makes sense in part because, as we saw above, the extraterritorial due process doctrine is itself apparently based on that analogy. See supra Section I.D.
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1. Civil Cases: The Necessity of a Threshold Actual Conflict
The Supreme Court has principally developed its jurisprudence of due
process limits on legislative jurisdiction in the choice-of-law context.152
These are civil cases, in which the plaintiff seeks application of one body of
substantive law and the defendant seeks application of another. These cases
typically follow the same three-step analytic progression.
In the first step, the court determines whether the potentially applicable
bodies of substantive law do, in fact, actually conflict with one another.153
After determining that there is an actual conflict, the court tentatively selects
which of the potentially applicable bodies of substantive law to apply.154 The
court then moves to the third and final stage of the analysis—determining
whether it is permissible under due process for the body of substantive law
that the court has tentatively selected to govern the dispute.155
It makes sense that due process should come last. Like any constitutional question, the issue of whether due process prohibits the application of
a given body of law should be avoided if possible.156 A litigant may erroneously imagine (or hope for) a difference between bodies of relevant law
152. See Florey, supra note 12, at 1068–82.
153. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 937 (N.Y. 1993) (“The first step in any
case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved.”); accord, e.g., Teleglobe USA, Inc. v. BCE
Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he practice of
the federal system and most states [is to] decide a choice-of-law dispute only when the proffered legal regimes actually conflict on a relevant point.”); On Air Entm’t Corp. v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 210 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[B]efore a choice of law question arises, there
must actually be a conflict between the potentially applicable bodies of law.”); In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 605 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981) (“All laws must
be carefully examined to determine that a conflict actually exists, under any choice-of-law
theory, before application of the theory.”); Pa. Emp., Benefit Tr. Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 710 F.
Supp. 2d 458, 466 (D. Del. 2010) (“Delaware’s choice of law approach entails a two-pronged
inquiry. First, it is necessary to compare the laws of the competing jurisdictions to determine
whether the laws actually conflict on a relevant point.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 Colum.
L. Rev. 1839, 1847 (2006) (“By definition, conflicts jurisprudence emerges only where the
substantive law of more than one state is potentially implicated by the events in controversy
and . . . the underlying substantive laws of the competing states vary in some significant
aspect.”); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 821 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Where applicable foreign and domestic law provide different substantive rules of
decision to govern the parties’ dispute, a conflict-of-laws analysis is necessary.” (emphasis
added)).
154. E.g., Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 419–23 (2d Cir. 2001) (determining that there is an “actual conflict,” and then proceeding to a choice-of-law analysis); Air
Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d at 605–08, 610–33 (same). This selection of substantive law is done
based on the controlling choice-of-law rules. See id. at 610–33. These rules may be based on
“territorial” considerations, for example, or they may derive from “interest analysis.” See, e.g.,
Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1277–85 (1989).
155. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–13 (1981) (plurality opinion).
156. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (“[W]e ought not
to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such [questions are] unavoidable.”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass
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when none exists. Comparison of the potentially applicable bodies of substantive law, right from the outset, may allow a court to dispose of the
choice-of-law issue before having to reach the constitutional question that
awaits at the end of the road. Resolving the first question (is there an actual
conflict?) before the last question (is there a due process violation?) is thus a
matter of prudence. But proceeding in that order is also legally required—
because in the absence of an actual conflict, there can be no due process
claim. Indeed, the Supreme Court has all but explicitly stated that rule. In
Phillips Petroleum, one of the leading modern choice-of-law cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the issue for eight Justices this way:
Petitioner contends that total application of Kansas substantive law violated
the constitutional limits on choice of law . . . . We must first determine
whether Kansas law conflicts in any material way with any other law which
could apply. There can be no injury in applying Kansas law if it is not in
conflict with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.157

As Justice Stevens put it, writing for himself: “[A]bsent any conflict of laws,
in terms of the results they produce, the Due Process Clause simply has not
been violated. . . . In this case it is perfectly clear that there has been no due
process violation because this is a classic ‘false conflicts’ case.”158
In short, all nine Justices in Phillips Petroleum agreed that simply being
subjected to a certain body of substantive law cannot, standing alone, be the
basis of a due process claim. Rather, there must be a “material,” “results”impacting difference between the body of law that was imposed and “any
other law which could apply.” This is an actual conflict, and it is not surprising that the Supreme Court required such a conflict as a threshold matter
before a due process claim could be pressed.
To see why, consider Allstate. In that case, Ralph Hague had three car
insurance policies, each with Allstate; each policy provided for a recovery up
to $15,000.159 Ralph Hague was killed in an accident, and his wife Lavinia
Hague sued Allstate.160 Lavinia Hague argued that Minnesota tort law was
controlling, and that under Minnesota law the three $15,000 insurance policies could be “stacked,” such that she could recover $45,000.161 Allstate
countered that Wisconsin tort law was controlling, that Wisconsin law prohibited stacking, and that, accordingly, the maximum recovery was
$15,000.162 For Allstate, the difference between application of Minnesota law
and Wisconsin law was worth something: $30,000, the difference between
upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
157. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985).
158. Id. at 837–38 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). In this context, a “false conflict” is the
opposite of an “actual conflict.” See id.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 305–06.
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what Allstate would pay out if Wisconsin tort law applied versus what Allstate would pay out if Minnesota tort law applied.163
But what if there was no actual conflict? If Minnesota and Wisconsin
law both allowed for a $15,000 recovery, it would make no practical difference for Allstate which body of tort law applied to the case. The case would
come out the same under either body of law. In the absence of an actual
conflict, nothing would turn on whether Minnesota law or Wisconsin law
applied. And in that circumstance, Allstate could hardly claim that application of one of those bodies of law was so unfair that its due process rights
were violated.
The point can be transposed into doctrinal terms. Due process claims
can go forward only if there is a threshold deprivation of property (or, in an
appropriate case, of life or liberty).164 In turn, due process property is, (1) an
“entitlement” that (2) has “monetary value.”165 And this definition is dispositive. In the absence of an actual conflict, even if Allstate had an entitlement
to application of Wisconsin law, that entitlement would have had no monetary value. Allstate would have been required to pay out the same $15,000
whether it received its entitlement (and Wisconsin law applied) or whether it
was deprived of its entitlement (because Wisconsin law was displaced and
Minnesota law applied). In the absence of an actual conflict, the entitlement
would be worthless. An entitlement that lacks all “monetary value” is not
property, and if property is not at stake in a lawsuit there can be no due
process claim.166
Nor is the logic of requiring a threshold actual conflict even particular
to due process. Constitutional claims generally require some sort of realworld injury before they can go forward.167 But the court’s application of the
wrong body of substantive law does not typically injure anyone unless something practical turns on which body of law applies.168
Take ex post facto law as an example. In that context, the defendant is
very much arguing that the court applied the wrong body of law—the court
applied the new law in force at the time of trial, not the old law in force at
163. See id.
164. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (noting that this
requirement applies in “every” case); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569 (1972).
165. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005); see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431 (1982); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
166. See sources cited supra note 165.
167. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
168. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting, in
the context of a due process claim, that “[i]t is no conceivable denial of constitutional right for
a State to decline to declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the requested
declaration.”); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the
[police] departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive
force is quite beside the point.” (emphasis omitted)).
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the time she acted. But in the ex post facto context, it is not generally
enough that there be some sort of purely formal difference between these
two bodies of law, old and new.169 Rather, there must be a practical, bottomline difference for the defendant,170 and that is only logically possible if the
old and new bodies of law are meaningfully different from each other—if
there is between them what amounts to an actual conflict.
2. From Civil to Criminal
As we saw above, the extraterritorial due process doctrine must be
grounded solely on a concern for fairness, generally understood as protecting against the upsetting of relevant expectations.171 But expectations can
only be upset when there is a discrepancy between baseline (what one expected would happen) and reality (what actually did happen)—in the case
of legislative jurisdiction, a discrepancy between the substantive law that one
expected would apply and the substantive law that did, in reality, apply.172 If
there is no actual conflict, then the only discrepancy between the expected
body of substantive law and the applied body of substantive law is its
source—in the example above, that one is Spanish substantive law and the
other is U.S. substantive law.173 But that formalistic distinction cannot
amount to a constitutionally sufficient upsetting of expectations. Phillips Petroleum makes that clear.174
And there is no reason that the logic of Phillips Petroleum does not apply
in criminal cases. In “every” case, due process has a role to play only after a
threshold deprivation of life, liberty, or property.175 But there can be no such
deprivation unless we imagine that, but for the application of a particular
body of substantive law, the defendant would have had more—more property, in a civil case like Phillips Petroleum, or more life or liberty, in a criminal case.
In short, just as a threshold actual conflict is required before a due process test is brought to bear with respect to civil legislative jurisdiction, so too
a threshold actual conflict should generally be required before the due process nexus test applies to criminal legislative jurisdiction.
This point is underscored by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in a nowobscure case, Nielsen v. Oregon.176 In Nielsen, Washington and Oregon

169. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896).
170. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24, 29 (1981); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183–84 (1915).
171. See supra Part II, Section III.A.
172. See supra Section III.B.1.
173. See supra Section III.A.
174. See supra Section III.B.1.
175. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).
176. See 212 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1909).
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shared jurisdiction over a river.177 Oregon’s laws criminalized certain conduct, Washington’s did not.178 This amounted to an actual conflict and the
Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Oregon conviction.179 The Court
framed the question as follows:
Where an act is . . . prohibited and punishable by the laws of both States,
the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense
. . . . [B]ut where as here the act is prohibited by one State and in terms
authorized by the other, can the one state which prohibits, prosecute and
punish for the act done within the territorial limits of the other?180

In the no-conflict scenario—“[w]here an act is . . . prohibited and punishable by the laws of both States”—it does not much matter which body of
criminal law is applied (“the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person
may prosecute the offense”). But if there is an actual conflict—if “the act is
prohibited by one State and in terms authorized by the other”—harder
questions about extraterritoriality begin to crop up. Why is it immaterial, in
the absence of an actual conflict, which body of law is applied? Another
court explained, in a case involving shared criminal jurisdiction over a
bridge, that if the defendant’s “conduct was in violation of the laws of both
states,” he “is hardly in a position to charge any basic unfairness.”181 In
short, in criminal cases, no less than in civil ones like Phillips Petroleum, it is
the existence of an actual conflict that triggers searching inquiry into the
scope of legislative jurisdiction.
This conclusion gathers added force when we consider the alternative. If
a threshold actual conflict were required before due process could be
brought to bear in civil cases under Phillips Petroleum, but not in criminal
cases, the result would be that U.S. civil legislative jurisdiction would be
broader than U.S. criminal legislative jurisdiction. This is because there
would be a class of cases—no-conflict cases—in which due process limits
the reach of criminal legislative jurisdiction, but does not limit the reach of
civil legislative jurisdiction.
An example helps to show how this would happen. Imagine that a company in France intentionally spews toxins; the toxins are inhaled by a Mexican national who then comes to the United States for a business trip—at
which point he gets sick and is hospitalized. And imagine further that the
tort law and the criminal law of all relevant entities are in perfect harmony—with no actual conflicts between France, Mexico, or the United
States.182 Because, under Phillips Petroleum, due process checks U.S. civil legislative jurisdiction only when there are actual conflicts, U.S. tort law could
177. Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 316.
178. Id. at 316–17.
179. Id. at 321.
180. Id. at 320.
181. State v. Holden, 217 A.2d 132, 134 (N.J. 1966).
182. For these purposes, imagine that there is an applicable body of U.S. tort and criminal
law.
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be applied to the French company’s actions—regardless of whether there is a
nexus to the United States that would be sufficiently strong to satisfy due
process. But if, by contrast, due process checked U.S. criminal legislative
jurisdiction whether there is an actual conflict or not, U.S. criminal law
could be applied to the French company’s actions only if there were a nexus
to the United States strong enough to satisfy due process.
This would amount to a deep divergence between the reach of legislative
jurisdiction in criminal cases versus civil ones. But the reach of a sovereign’s
extraterritorial power to prescribe should not substantially vary depending
on whether the sovereign is prescribing standards of conduct backed by civil
remedies or by criminal sanctions. The underlying jurisdictional bases are
the same.183 “The principles governing [extraterritorial] jurisdiction to prescribe . . . apply to criminal as well as to civil regulation.”184 That is why the
Supreme Court has directly analogized from the extent of Congress’s extraterritorial criminal power to the extent of Congress’s extraterritorial civil
power.185 That is why no one suggests that civil and criminal cases should be
treated differently on a core question of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction—whether Congress can reach into a foreign country and require a U.S.
citizen living there to come back to the United States to testify.186 And that is
why one of the Supreme Court’s major twentieth century precedents on the
extraterritorial reach of criminal legislative jurisdiction, Skiriotes v. Florida,187 was based principally on civil legislative jurisdiction decisions,188 and
183. Compare, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1994)
(criminal) with Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 76 (3d Cir.
1994) (civil).
184. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 403 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
185. See, e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948).
186. In 1932, the Supreme Court upheld the issuance of a subpoena to compel the return
of an American citizen to the United States for testimony in a criminal trial. Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). The subpoena, issued under the Walsh Act, was held not to
exceed the reach of federal legislative jurisdiction. In 1964, the Act was amended to allow the
issuance of extraterritorial subpoenas to U.S. citizens in civil cases—and since then courts have
closely examined whether Walsh Act subpoenas should issue in civil cases on numerous occasions. E.g., Balk v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 974 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v.
Sabhlok, No. C 08-4238 CRB (JL), 2009 WL 3561523, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009); Estate
of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Klesch & Co. v.
Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 523 (D. Colo. 2003). But none of these cases have even
entertained the possibility that although Walsh Act subpoenas do not exceed legislative jurisdiction in criminal cases, as Blackmer held—such subpoenas might nonetheless exceed legislative jurisdiction in civil cases. Rather, the unyielding assumption is that the reach of criminal
and civil legislative jurisdiction are co-terminus. This makes sense, because “in assessing
whether an assertion of extraterritorial subpoena power violates the due process clause, the
distinction between criminal and civil actions is not constitutionally significant.” Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 37, 104 (1989).
187. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
188. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73, 77, 79 (first citing Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924); then
citing Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore (The Hamilton), 207 U.S. 398 (1907); then citing Del
Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U.S. 674 (1898); and then citing United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938)).
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why Skiriotes, the criminal legislative jurisdiction case, has principally influenced civil legislative jurisdiction decisions.189
3. The Added Impetus for Actual Conflicts in Criminal Cases
Section III.B.1 argued that there must generally be a threshold actual
conflict before due process is brought into play to check the reach of civil
legislative jurisdiction, and Section III.B.2 showed that an actual conflict is
required in criminal cases as well. This Section argues that the constitutional
necessity of an actual conflict looms even larger in criminal cases than civil
ones.
To see the argument, start with a puzzle. The constitutional necessity of
a threshold actual conflict is a foundational point. But so far as I can tell,
this point has never been mentioned. Why? Until very recently, all of the
cases regarding due process limits on legislative jurisdiction have been civil,
not criminal. And in civil cases, the point that the Constitution requires an
actual conflict has no substantial practical impact—and is therefore very
hard to see. This lack of a practical impact in civil cases flows from two
sources.
The first is litigation incentives. Civil legislative jurisdiction cases are
typically choice-of-law cases, and choice of law is a famously complicated
area, with a bad reputation: “[A] dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.”190 Lawyers
who want to raise a choice-of-law argument must initiate themselves into
the field’s considerable mysteries. That is costly191 and a strong financial disincentive to raising pointless arguments. There is little reason to argue about
whether Minnesota or Wisconsin tort law applies if, because there is no actual conflict, the case will turn out the same either way. This means that
even if there were not a threshold constitutional requirement of an actual
conflict, civil litigants would, in any event, be incentivized to raise choice-oflaw arguments only if there were, indeed, an actual conflict.
Then there is doctrinal structure. Recall that in the first step of a choiceof-law analysis, state choice-of-law rules generally require the court to determine if there is an actual conflict. If there is no actual conflict, the analysis
ends; the third stage of the analysis, the due process stage, is never reached.
If there is an actual conflict in the first stage, the analysis can then proceed—
eventually reaching the due process stage.192 This means that a court undertakes a due process analysis (in the third stage) only because it already found
189. E.g., Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 333 (1973); Alaska v.
Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 203 (1961).
190. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953).
191. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of
Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 11–12 (1991) (describing choice-of-law litigation as “expensive
and time-consuming”).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155.
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an actual conflict (in the first stage); the threshold of actual conflict must
necessarily have been crossed before there is any consideration of due process. This is why, in the choice-of-law context, it does not generally matter
whether due process is self-consciously understood to require an actual conflict. An actual conflict is already required—independently, at the first stage
of the analysis. If only by misdirection, the due process obligation of a
threshold actual conflict is virtually always satisfied.
But these two factors, doctrinal structure and litigation incentives, do
not do the same work in criminal cases. As to doctrinal structure, in criminal cases, no preliminary legal inquiry requires the existence of an actual
conflict. Accordingly, in criminal cases the constitutional actual conflict cannot be satisfied indirectly, by virtue of an actual conflict being required by
some other part of the law. Rather, in criminal cases, if due process is not
itself understood as requiring an actual conflict, then no actual conflict will
be required at any point.
Nor do litigation incentives function in criminal cases as they do in civil
ones. As noted above, in civil cases litigation incentives help to ensure that,
whatever the law’s formal dictates might be, there is always an actual conflict. If Minnesota and Wisconsin tort law do not actually conflict, there is
no practical upside in convincing a Minnesota judge that due process prevents application of Minnesota law. Because if the judge is convinced, she
will then just apply Wisconsin law—which, by hypothesis, is in harmony
with Minnesota law anyway. But things are different in a criminal case. Convincing the Minnesota judge that due process prevents application of Minnesota criminal law will not cause the judge to apply Wisconsin criminal
law. Indeed, the Minnesota judge cannot apply Wisconsin criminal law.193 If
the Minnesota judge is convinced that due process prevents application of
Minnesota criminal law, the case will not simply toggle from one body of
substantive law to another, as a civil action might. Rather, the criminal prosecution will be dismissed.194 This is, again, a deep contrast. In a civil action,
in the absence of an actual conflict there is generally no upside for the defendant in showing that due process prevents application of a certain body
of law. In a criminal case, there is an enormous upside for the defendant in
showing that due process prevents application of a certain body of law. That
upside is dismissal of the prosecution, the greatest prize of all—and the defendant’s incentive to pursue it has nothing to do with whether there is an
actual conflict.
In short, the constitutional necessity of a threshold actual conflict need
not be a self-conscious part of civil legislative jurisdiction law. Because of
litigation incentives and doctrinal structure, legislative jurisdiction issues
will generally be raised in civil cases only if there is an actual conflict. But
that is not how things work in criminal cases. In criminal cases, if an actual

193. See supra text accompanying note 37.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2006).
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conflict is not explicitly understood as a legally necessary threshold requirement, due process claims will be pressed by defendants even when there is
no such conflict.
4. Fair Warning and Actual Conflict
Requiring a threshold actual conflict makes sense in criminal cases for
another reason as well: it would bring the extraterritorial due process doctrine in line with its closest constitutional relation, fair-warning law. Fair
warning is a due process doctrine with three canonical “manifestations”:
void-for-vagueness, the rule of lenity, and the rule against judicial interpretations of criminal statutes that retrospectively expand their scope.195 In extraterritorial prosecutions, defendants have begun to press a novel kind of
fair-warning claim. The most prominent case in this emerging area is United
States v. Al Kassar.196 As noted above, the lead defendant in Al Kassar was a
Spanish citizen who worked, principally from Spain, to ship missiles to purported narco-terrorists in Colombia; the traffickers said they wanted the
missiles to shoot down U.S. military personnel.197 The Al Kassar defendants
sought to vacate their convictions on fair-warning grounds, and the Second
Circuit rejected their claim:
Fair warning does not require that the defendants understand that they
could be subject to criminal prosecution in the United States so long as they
would reasonably understand that their conduct was criminal and would
subject them to prosecution somewhere. The defendants were not ensnared
by a trap laid for the unwary. Supplying weapons illegally . . . to a known
terrorist organization with the understanding that those weapons would be
used to kill U.S. citizens and destroy U.S. property is self-evidently criminal . . . .198

So too in United States v. Bin Laden,199 the other leading case. That was a
U.S. prosecution based on bombings of American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. There, the court also rejected a fair-warning claim, because even if
the defendant did not know the “breadth of the statutory framework that
would serve as the basis for the [U.S.] charges against him—few defendants
do—there is no room for him to suggest that he has suddenly learned that
mass murder was illegal in the United States or anywhere else.”200
195. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265–66 (1997).
196. 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011).
197. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 115–16. The narco-traffickers identified themselves as members of the FARC, a left-wing Colombian organization. Id. at 115. That organization has been
designated as a terror group by the United States. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dep’t
of State, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [http://perma.cc/8WCE-TXCV].
198. Al Kassar, 606 F.3d at 119; accord United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 553–54 (4th
Cir. 2012) (following Al Kassar on this point).
199. 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
200. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 218–19 (quoting Gov’t Memo at 34, United States v. Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 1:98-CR-01023)); accord United States v.
Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223–24 (D.N.M. 2008) (following Bin Laden on this point).
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All of this makes sense from a fairness perspective. “[T]he purpose of
the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his
or her conduct to the law.”201 It is unfair that a person who expects that he is
conforming his conduct to the criminal law turns out, to his surprise, not to
be. That can happen in the domestic context when, for example, a statute is
vaguely worded. And it can happen in the extraterritorial context, when the
crux of a defendant’s claim is that he was not made aware (not fairly
warned) of a switch—a switch from regulation of his conduct by one body
of criminal law (the local criminal law of Spain, Kenya, or Tanzania) to regulation of that same conduct by another body of criminal law (U.S. criminal
law, under which he is now being prosecuted).
But flipping between legal regimes does not threaten to undo the defendant’s expectation that he has conformed his conduct to the law when there
is no actual conflict between local law and U.S. law. Shipping missiles to
narco-terrorists is “self-evidently criminal,” a crime under the laws of any
possibly relevant country. Accordingly, the Spanish defendant in Al Kassar
could have conformed his conduct to U.S. law without being warned of its
terms or applicability—effortlessly, simply by conforming his conduct to
Spanish law. In Bin Laden, too. The Kenyan and Tanzanian bombers could
have stayed on the right side of U.S. criminal law (which forbids murder)
just by following Kenyan and Tanzanian criminal law (which also does).
Murder is illegal everywhere; as in Al Kassar, it did not matter which bodies
of criminal law applied because they all proscribed the same thing.
The fair-warning law that has begun to develop functions in the same
way that, this Article argues, the extraterritorial due process doctrine should
function. In each context, the mere application of U.S. criminal law to defendants’ conduct abroad does not, standing alone, trigger a due process
issue. Rather, due process enters the picture only when there is an actual
conflict. This confluence is no coincidence. Properly understood, each due
process doctrine flows from the same basic concern for upsetting the defendant’s expectations with respect to the substantive criminal law he thought
would govern his behavior. And these expectations cannot be upset if there
is no deep disjunction, no actual conflict, between the body of criminal law
(Spanish, Tanzanian, or Kenyan) that would have applied to the defendant
and the body of criminal law (U.S. criminal law) that either was applied to
the defendant, in the case of the extraterritorial due process doctrine, or that
was applied to the defendant without sufficient warning, in the case of fairwarning law.
5. Sentencing Conflicts
To this point, this Article has considered only actual conflicts—in which
a defendant’s conduct was lawful under the substantive law of the place
where she acted but unlawful under the law of the United States, where she

201. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999).
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was prosecuted. I have argued that an actual-conflict scenario should be understood to trigger application of due process checks on criminal legislative
jurisdiction—but a no-conflict scenario should not.
But there should be no doubt that, even in no-conflict cases, deep discrepancies between U.S. sentencing law and the sentencing law that would
otherwise have applied to the defendant should trigger application of due
process protections. Sentencing in criminal cases is closely analogous to
damages in civil cases; each is the follow-on consequence of a finding of
liability. And in civil cases, large differences in how damages are to be calculated can emphatically trigger application of due process limits. Indeed, both
Phillips Petroleum and Allstate involved differences between two bodies of
law with respect to the permissible measure of damages.202 The fact that
deep conflicts in damages law in civil cases can trigger application of due
process suggests that deep conflicts in sentencing law in criminal cases
should also trigger application of due process.
This makes sense. Imagine if our hypothetical Spanish defendant had
faced a five-year maximum sentence if she had been prosecuted in Spain,
but, prosecuted in the United States, she now faces a fifty-year mandatory
minimum sentence. This is closely analogous to an actual conflict—the law
of the place where the defendant acted (Spanish sentencing law) permitted
an outcome (freedom after five years in prison) that is essentially forbidden
by the corresponding body of U.S. law.
If discrepancies in sentencing law regimes—I will call them “sentencing
conflicts”—can trigger application of the extraterritorial due process doctrine, this raises a number of questions. For example, how different must
two sets of sentencing laws be before the discrepancy between them triggers
application of the due process “nexus” test? The Supreme Court has considered related questions in other areas of constitutional criminal law,203 and
they are hard.
But those questions are not especially important from a practical perspective. This is because sentencing is dynamic. For example, to facilitate
extraditions from countries that want to cap their citizens’ sentencing exposure, federal prosecutors routinely represent that if a certain extraterritorial
prosecution is permitted to go forward, the United States will not seek a
sentence above a given ceiling.204 Against this backdrop, it would seem readily possible for U.S. prosecutors to wholly eliminate sentencing conflicts—
and the due process-triggering unfairness that comes with them—simply by
making binding representations that they will not seek certain penalties. For
example, if a sentencing conflict results because the death penalty is available
in the United States but not Spain, prosecutors can wholly eliminate that
conflict by agreeing in advance not to seek the death penalty.
202. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816–17 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 307, 320 (1981) (plurality opinion).
203. E.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085–86 (2013) (discussing ex post facto
laws).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Accordingly, prosecutors can unilaterally transform scenarios that involve sentencing conflicts into no-conflict scenarios. In this sense, prosecutors could opt out of the extraterritorial due process doctrine, and its
“nexus” requirement, by committing not to seek certain sentences. Sentencing conflicts would not lead, in practice, to the dismissal of any prosecutions. Rather, they would lead to something potentially important, but
something much different—to some lower sentences.205
C. A Reformulated Doctrine
The extraterritorial due process doctrine, animated solely by concerns
for fairness,206 and reformulated in light of the arguments developed
above,207 would function as follows. In actual-conflict cases, the doctrine
would apply as it does today—U.S. prosecutions could go forward only if
they had a sufficient nexus to the United States.
In some no-conflict cases, in which there are sentencing conflicts, the
extraterritorial due process doctrine would also apply. But such cases would,
as a practical matter, melt away. This is because if the extraterritorial due
process doctrine’s strictures could not be satisfied in a given sentencingconflicts case, prosecutors could, themselves, eliminate the conflict, by
agreeing to cap the defendant’s sentencing exposure. This would eliminate
the unfairness of the sentencing conflict—and, with it, the need to apply the
extraterritorial due process doctrine.
Finally, in some no-conflict cases, those that do not involve a sentencing
conflict, the extraterritorial due process doctrine would not apply. Assuming
no other impediments—Article I limits, for example—the federal government would be constitutionally permitted to prosecute a defendant without
regard for the nexus that her conduct has or does not have to the United
States. This would not be unfair to defendants—by hypothesis, there would
be no actual conflict, and no sentencing conflict. And while some other nations might object to such prosecutions, protecting against international
frictions is a matter for Congress and for the President, not for the courts
and the Constitution.208
205. In some cases, something akin to a sentencing conflict might be created (or deepened) by the existence of relatively harsher prison conditions in the United States, or the
relatively greater distance between a defendant imprisoned in the United States and her family
that will need to visit from abroad. But these sorts of concerns can very much be reflected in
the sentence imposed by the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 264 F.3d 191, 196–97 (2d
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (discussing the conditions of confinement that created a sentencing
conflict); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing how family ties are
a valid reason for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines); cf. United States v.
Lipman, 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a non-U.S. citizen’s sentence can be reduced based on extent of cultural connection to the United States).
206. See supra Part II.
207. See supra Sections III.A–B.
208. Note that there may sometimes be scenarios in which there is no actual conflict and
no sentencing conflict—but it nonetheless may make sense to apply the extraterritorial due
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IV. Judicial Jurisdiction
To this point, I have argued that the extraterritorial due process doctrine
can potentially have traction in actual-conflict cases and in cases in which
there is a sentencing conflict—but not otherwise. But how can this be?
Spanish and U.S. law may both proscribe murder, and may both punish it in
precisely the same way; there is no conflict of any kind. But application of
U.S. criminal law to our hypothetical Spanish defendant means that she will
be subject to prosecution in America, halfway around the world, a trial conducted before a foreign jury, in a foreign legal system, and in what is likely a
foreign language. She will be away from the support of family and the comforts of home, in an American prison during a potentially long pretrial period and, in the event of a conviction, for a period afterward. These are
serious concerns, and they certainly sound in unfairness and upsetting of
expectations.
But none of these concerns is a reason to bring to bear due process
limits on legislative jurisdiction. That is because these are all matters of judicial jurisdiction, of the burdens of being tried in a court that, to the defendant, seems terribly inconvenient—perhaps to the point of constitutional
unfairness. But judicial jurisdiction is controlled by its own body of constitutional law. This is the difference in civil cases between Allstate209 (legislative jurisdiction) and Pennoyer v. Neff210 or International Shoe211 (judicial
jurisdiction); in criminal cases, this is the difference between Davis212 or
Yousef213 (legislative jurisdiction) and Ker, Frisbie, or Alvarez-Machain (judicial jurisdiction).214 And the Supreme Court has emphasized—over and over
again, literally for generations—that judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction are separate, each controlled by its own body of law.215
process doctrine. For example, the outcome of a particular prosecution may turn on an affirmative defense, like intoxication or duress, and these defenses may be different in a material
way under the relevant bodies of law. Such scenarios seem quite obscure. They are worth
noting, but should not detain us here. In a similar vein, differences between procedural laws—
differing lengths of statutes of limitations, for example—do not seem to fall within the domains of due process limits on civil legislative jurisdiction, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 729–30 (1988), and, accordingly, should not be taken to fall within the analogous domains of due process limits on criminal legislative jurisdiction.
209. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion) (legislative
jurisdiction).
210. 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (judicial jurisdiction).
211. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (judicial jurisdiction).
212. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247–50 (9th Cir. 1990) (legislative jurisdiction).
213. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 85–114 (2d Cir. 2003) (judicial jurisdiction).
214. Under the Ker-Frisbie rule, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the
“power of a court to try a person for crime” is affected by the manner in which the defendant
came before the court. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521 (1952). The major cases are the
ones referenced in the text: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Frisbie, 342
U.S. 519; and Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
215. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (plurality
opinion); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
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In criminal cases, it has long been conventionally thought that U.S.
courts may exercise judicial jurisdiction over any defendant physically before
the court,216 without regard to how the defendant got there.217 To some observers, this can seem unfair.218 But if judicial jurisdiction’s purported unfairness is placed into starker relief by a lack of due process checks on
legislative jurisdiction, then that may be a strong reason to work a change in
judicial jurisdiction. But it is not a reason to expand due process checks on
legislative jurisdiction, to apply such checks because of concerns that would
otherwise be outside of its domains.219 If it seems unfair to try our hypothetical Spanish defendant in the United States, few would suggest that the
proper response is to do some tinkering and compensating in other areas of
constitutional criminal law—by giving the defendant a right to an even
speedier trial; by raising the burden of proof for her higher than “beyond a
reasonable doubt”; by expanding her rights to challenge searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment beyond everyone else’s. Constitutional rights are not generally thought of as a system of free-form adjustments, where every action (this looks unfair) merits an equal and
opposite—and ad hoc—reaction (so make that more fair over there). If
there is unfairness in judicial jurisdiction law, it should not lead to a trimming of legislative jurisdiction’s sails.
Perhaps, though, it might be argued that in the criminal context there is
no meaningful difference between legislative and judicial jurisdiction—such
that it makes sense to treat them as a single system. In civil cases, it might be
said, a sovereign’s courts can have jurisdiction, but the sovereign’s substantive laws might not apply; judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction are
thus separate. By contrast, it might be argued, in criminal cases this cannot
happen—the sovereign’s courts always apply the sovereign’s substantive
criminal laws,220 so judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction collapse
into one another.
But this is not persuasive. It is true that, in criminal cases, when a sovereign’s courts have judicial jurisdiction (because the defendant is physically
present before the court), the sovereign’s courts never apply the substantive
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
216. E.g., Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology
316, 321 (1926) (“The principle is absolute in Anglo-American law that the accused must be
present in court at the time he is being tried. . . . Nor does it matter how such control was
secured.”); accord, e.g., United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003); Stamphill v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291, 292 (9th
Cir. 1943); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) (“[T]he defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage
. . . .”).
217. See supra note 214.
218. E.g., Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Ker-Frisbie rule is “deeply disturb[ing]” to “most courts throughout the civilized world”).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 144–145.
220. See supra note 37 .
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law of another sovereign. But that does not mean that the court always applies its own substantive criminal law. That is, indeed, what the extraterritorial due process doctrine is all about. In extraterritorial due process cases,
the court has judicial jurisdiction—the defendant is physically present, there
before the court. But then the court nonetheless considers whether it has
legislative jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction does not follow inevitably
from judicial jurisdiction in criminal cases. If it did, there would have been
nothing to say in Davis, for example, other than “the defendant is here, so
we apply U.S. criminal law.” The reverse is also true. There have been criminal cases in which courts very clearly have legislative jurisdiction but then
consider, separately, whether they have judicial jurisdiction. These are cases
like United States v. Toscanino221 and United States v. Anderson,222 and,
whatever else might be said about them,223 those cases demonstrate that judicial jurisdiction is not understood to follow automatically from legislative
jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction are, in short, separate in
civil cases—and in criminal ones, too. It does not make sense to solve a felt
problem in one area of law by tinkering with what is another, separate body
of law—by responding to perceived looseness in the law of judicial jurisdiction by tightening up the law of legislative jurisdiction beyond what is otherwise warranted.224
V. Actual Conflicts
As argued above, a reformulated extraterritorial due process doctrine
and its nexus test should be applied only in actual-conflict cases and in sentencing-conflict cases.225 If it did apply only in those cases, the doctrine
would, in practice, potentially lead to the quashing of prosecutions only in
actual-conflict scenarios.226 Under current law, however, the extraterritorial
due process doctrine applies across the board—in actual-conflict cases, sentencing-conflict cases, and no-conflict cases.227
This Part shows that there is a large practical gulf between these two
approaches. Because of certain major structural aspects of international law
enforcement, extraterritorial prosecutions are overwhelmingly—perhaps exclusively—no-conflict cases. Concomitantly, when it comes to extraterritorial prosecutions, actual-conflict cases are exceedingly rare, if they exist at
221. 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering whether to decline judicial jurisdiction
over the defendant even though he is physically present before the court).
222. 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 957 F.2d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1992) (questioning
Toscanino’s “continuing constitutional vitality” given the Supreme Court’s post-Toscanino reaffirmation of the Ker–Frisbie doctrine).
224. In a forthcoming article, I explain how due process limits on judicial jurisdiction
should be understood to function in extraterritorial criminal cases.
225. See supra Section III.C.
226. See supra Sections III.B.5 and III.C.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 41–48.

February 2016]

Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction

549

all. It bears noting at the outset that there is no ready way empirically to
determine the relative prevalence of actual-conflict prosecutions and noconflict prosecutions. But in the absence of empirical information, we can
proceed by inference from the major structural forces that shape international-criminal-law enforcement: extradition, mens rea requirements, and
international law.
First, the nature of extradition makes actual-conflict cases very rare. If
two countries are parties to an extradition treaty, one country may request
that a second country arrest an individual and send him to the first country
for prosecution there.228 The United States is a party to more than a hundred
extradition treaties.229 Each year the United States requests hundreds of extraditions from other countries,230 and extradition is the standard means by
which foreign defendants arrive in the United States after U.S. prosecutors
charge them for conduct that took place abroad.231 Every (or virtually every)
U.S. extradition treaty includes a “dual criminality” requirement.232 Under
dual criminality, “an accused person can be extradited only if the conduct
complained of is considered criminal . . . under the laws of both the requesting and requested nations.”233 Accordingly, where dual criminality applies, a
228. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 475 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (“A state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply
with the request of another state party to that treaty to arrest and deliver a person duly shown
to be sought by that state . . . .”).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012) (listing current extradition treaties).
230. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Review of the Office of International Affairs’
Role in the International Extradition of Fugitives 8–10 (2002), https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/OBD/e0208/extradition.pdf [https://perma.cc/P67Y-NK3J] (providing statistics).
231. Aside from extradition, there are some other ways that the United States gains custody over foreign defendants. Rendition, for example, is defined as “the forcible movement of
an individual from one country to another, without use of a formal legal process, such as an
extradition mechanism.” Daniel L. Pines, Rendition Operations: Does U.S. Law Impose Any
Restrictions?, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 523, 525 (2011). Renditions get headlines, but this in large
part because they are exceptional. E.g., Ernesto Londoño, Capture of Bombing Suspect in Libya
Represents Rare ‘Rendition’ by U.S. Military, Wash. Post (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/libya-condemns-us-raid-and-capture-of-bombingsuspect/2013/10/06/aad8b7ec-2ea6-11e3-8906-3daa2bcde110_story.html [http://perma.cc/
2PW2-QA5K] (describing forcible capture of al Qaeda leader by U.S. military on the streets of
Tripoli, and his transfer to the United States). Extraditions, by contrast, are utterly commonplace, the background standard from which rendition departs. See, e.g., Melanie M. Laflin,
Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals to Justice Through Irregular Rendition
and Other Quasi-Legal Options, 26 J. Legis. 315, 319–20 (2000).
232. There is some dispute as to whether dual criminality is a requirement of every U.S.
extradition treaty. Compare John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76
Geo. L.J. 1441, 1459 (1988) (describing dual criminality as standard in “nearly every” treaty),
with Michael John Garcia & Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., 98-958, Extradition
to and from the United States: Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties 10 (2010) (describing
dual criminality as feature of “all” treaties).
233. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986); accord Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 311 (1922) (“[A]n offense is extraditable only if the acts charged are criminal by the
laws of both countries.”); Extradition Treaty with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-23, art. 2(1) (“An offense shall be an extraditable
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defendant cannot be extradited to the United States unless the U.S. crime
with which he is charged is also, in substance, a crime in the country from
which the defendant was extradited.
The dual criminality requirement works to eliminate actual conflicts.
Indeed, in a nutshell, that is its function. If the charged defendant is liable
under U.S. criminal law but is not liable under the law of the place from
which extradition is sought, the dual criminality requirement would flatly
bar extradition. No U.S. prosecution would even get underway. When there
is an actual conflict, there is no dual criminality; and when there is no dual
criminality, there is no extradition.234
Aside from extradition, mens rea requirements in U.S. criminal statutes
also help make actual-conflict cases rare. Many major extraterritorial prosecutions concern violations of the federal terrorism laws. But the terrorism
laws that apply extraterritorially generally include some sort of mens rea
requirement.235 Accordingly, a person can usually be charged with violating
these laws only if the government can prove that she knew she was acting
with the requisite mental state. And such proof would of course be hard to
come by if there were an actual conflict—that is, if the conduct that forms
the basis of the U.S. criminal charge was lawful in the place where it was
undertaken. A person in Lebanon who gives money to Hezbollah may be
less likely to think that this is wrongful, given that Hezbollah is currently the
second-largest political party in Lebanon’s parliament. Mens rea requirements, in short, tend to further reduce the number of actual conflicts in
extraterritorial criminal prosecutions. If a criminal defendant is charged in
the United States for conduct that was not a crime where it was undertaken,
it would often be hard for U.S. prosecutors to prove that the defendant acted
with the requisite mental state—and prosecutors of course do not seek to
bring cases that they have little chance of winning.
Finally, large swaths of international law also tend to reduce the number
of actual conflicts. There are a series of multilateral treaties in which large
numbers of nations (including the United States) have committed to passing
their own domestic criminal laws to proscribe certain agreed-on conduct.236
An example is the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft.237 Signed in 1970, the Convention described the offense
of air piracy (hijacking), and it required each of the Convention’s signatories
offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States
. . . .”).
234. As Professor Richman wisely pointed out to me, a country (say Spain) would be
exceedingly unlikely to extradite a defendant to the United States for a crime that, while a
violation of Spanish criminal law as a formal matter, had fallen into desuetude in Spain and
was no longer being enforced there.
235. For the relevant terrorism statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2012); for the
narcotics statutes, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 951–971 (2012).
236. Antonio Cassese, International Law 153–55 (2d ed. 2005).
237. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Mar. 8, 1973, 860
U.N.T.S. 105.
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to criminalize that offense under their domestic laws.238 The Hague Convention now has 185 signatories; virtually every country in the world has signed
on.239 Such conventions greatly reduce the likelihood of an actual conflict. A
defendant prosecuted in the United States for an extraterritorial hijacking is
overwhelmingly likely to have acted in a country that, like the United States,
has criminalized hijacking pursuant to the Hague Convention.
Aside from the Hague Convention, the United States has enacted a great
many criminal statutes pursuant to obligations undertaken in multilateral
international conventions. Some of these statutes are necessarily more obscure than others. But others are right in the mainstream of federal criminal
law. The basic federal anti-narcotics statute is the Controlled Substances Act
of 1970,240 and that statute is used for vast numbers of prosecutions, including many important extraterritorial prosecutions.241 Congress enacted the
Controlled Substances Act in part to satisfy obligations that the United
States had incurred in a multilateral treaty.242 Similarly, terrorism cases are
at the heart of contemporary extraterritorial prosecutions. And, by one
count, Congress has passed more than twenty antiterrorism criminal statutes
to satisfy multilateral treaty obligations.243 Such statutes, by definition,
criminalize conduct that is illegal not just in the United States, but also in
many countries around the world.
In sum, in the context of extraterritorial prosecutions the number of
actual conflicts is dramatically reduced by the combined effect of three major structural features of international-law enforcement: dual criminality obligations in extradition treaties, mens rea requirements, and modern
multilateral treaties. These, together, make it exceedingly unlikely that when
we speak of extraterritorial prosecutions we are speaking of actual-conflict
cases—there may not even, in fact, be any.
* * *
238. Id. at art. 2.
239. Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Signatories to Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/
Hague_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/6V7U-4UKQ]. In 1974, the United States discharged its own
Hague Convention obligations by passing an antihijacking law. See 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2012).
240. Gregory Kau, Flashback to the Federal Analog Act of 1986: Mixing Rules and Standards
in the Cauldron, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077, 1082 (2008) (describing the statute’s history).
241. E.g., United States v. Manuel, 371 F. Supp. 2d 404, 408–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
242. Brief of Former State Department Legal Advisers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 4518602, at
*6–7 (citing, inter alia, 21 U.S.C. § 801(7) (2012)).
243. John De Pue, Fundamental Principles Governing Extraterritorial Prosecutions, U.S.
Atty’s Bulletin 9–13 (2007), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/04/
20/usab5502.pdf [http://perma.cc/75V3-4QF4] (Department of Justice publication, enumerating more than twenty distinct federal crimes established to implement “international agreements, to which the United States is a party, [that] are designed to thwart acts of terrorism”);
see also Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing an additional related
example); Kadic v. Karad_iæ, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Michael J. Matheson,
The Amendment of the War Crimes Act, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 52 (2007) (same).
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This conclusion implies two important practical points. First, the reformulated extraterritorial due process doctrine that this Article proposes,
which would do the large bulk of its work in actual-conflict cases, would
lead to the short-circuiting of prosecutions only very rarely—because actual-conflict cases are themselves so rare. And second, the mirror-image
point: current extraterritorial due process doctrine is not only jurisprudentially misguided,244 but it is, in practice, vastly overbroad. Due process’s major task, of precluding unfair prosecutions, should be accomplished in
actual-conflict cases, I have argued. But because it is applied virtually across
the board under current law, the extraterritorial due process doctrine is being applied to no-conflict cases. And this is not happening sometimes or
even frequently. Rather, it is happening ubiquitously—perhaps every single
time that the doctrine is applied.
VI. A Reformulated Doctrine and the Wages
of the Current “Approach
I have argued that the extraterritorial due process doctrine should apply
only when an extraterritorial prosecution is unfair to the defendant.245 Protecting against such unfairness, a reformulated extraterritorial due process
doctrine would be triggered in actual-conflict cases.246 These cases are very
rare,247 but when they occur, prosecutors would be required to show a nexus
to the United States. A reformulated extraterritorial due process doctrine
would also apply to sentencing-conflict cases—but in those cases, the doctrine would likely melt away, leaving lower sentences for some defendants in
its wake, but not to the dismissal of many cases.248
This is a much narrower extraterritorial due process doctrine than the
one we have. I have explained from a jurisprudential perspective why, under
current law, the extraterritorial due process doctrine is overbroad.
And none of this is abstract. There are important practical consequences
of the gap between the broad, across-the-board due process doctrine that we
currently have and the narrow due process doctrine that, I have argued, we
should have. The most significant practical consequence may be the most
obvious one: public safety is impacted. Under current law, major extraterritorial prosecutions are foregone because while it is clear that a given person
is violating U.S. criminal law, it is not clear that the doctrine’s “nexus” stricture can be satisfied. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, the
244. See supra Parts II, III.
245. See supra Part III.
246. See supra Part III.
247. See supra Part V.
248. See supra Sections III.B.5, III.C. Note that the approach I have proposed, in which
actual-conflict and no-conflict cases are treated differently for due process purposes, finds
echoes in international law, where a sovereign’s capacity to legislate extraterritorially depends
in part on whether the conduct reached by the extraterritorial legislation was lawful or unlawful where it was undertaken. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 403(2)(d), (h) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
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Nigerian terror group, is responsible for the deaths of many thousands of
Africans,249 and it seems perfectly clear that he has violated U.S. criminal
law.250 But could a U.S. prosecution of Shekau pass due process muster?
Under a reformulated extraterritorial due process doctrine, the prosecution could plainly proceed. There is no actual conflict because Sheku’s
wholesale murder and kidnapping are, of course, illegal everywhere. And if
there is a sentencing conflict—because Sheku might be punished more
harshly in the United States than he would be in Nigeria—that sentencing
conflict can be removed if prosecutors agree to cap the punishment that
Sheku might receive. In the absence of these conflicts, there is no unfairness
to Sheku and the prosecution could proceed—even without showing a
nexus to the United States.251
But could a prosecution proceed under the extraterritorial due process
doctrine as it is currently formulated? That is doubtful, at least from the
public record. The nexus between Boko Haram and the United States is not
terribly robust,252 and it seems unlikely that Sheku could therefore be prosecuted in the United States. Even though there is no unfairness to him in such
a prosecution. Even though the United States is deeply invested in fighting
Boko Haram.253 Even if the Nigerian government, under the strain of a war
with Boko Haram, asks the United States to mount the prosecution.254 Even
249. E.g., #BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the Threat of Boko Haram: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 5–7 (2014)
[hereinafter #BringBackOurGirls Hearing] (statement of Hon. Robert P. Jackson, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs).
250. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2442 (2012) (extraterritorial U.S. criminal statute proscribing
conscripting children for fighting), with Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and
Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region, CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Ctr., West
Point, N.Y.), Oct. 2014, at 5, 6–8, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitmentfinancing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region [https://perma.cc/TL3Y-K6UD]
(describing Boko Haram’s program of forcibly abducting children for fighting).
251. This does not mean that any person in the world can be prosecuted in the United
States provided that there is no actual conflict. Regardless of whether due process is satisfied, a
federal criminal statute must of course nonetheless be within Congress’s Article I reach. See,
e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109–17 (9th Cir. 2006). There is little doubt that
the broad impact of Nigeria’s Boko Haram on economic life in all of southern Africa allows
Congress to reach the group’s leader under Article I. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (stating that as compared to the—very broad—scope of the
interstate Commerce Clause, “the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce
power to be the greater”). And it is just as clear that the actions of a Nigerian pickpocket acting
in Nigeria cannot even begin to cross the Article I threshold—such that Congress cannot
constitutionally proscribe such pickpocketing, even if there is no actual conflict.
252. E.g., Boko Haram: The Growing Threat to Schoolgirls, Nigeria, and Beyond: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. 10, 12 (2014) (prepared statement of
Hon. Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights)
(“Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based group that . . . has metastasized into a regional threat.”).
253. E.g., #BringBackOurGirls Hearing, supra note 249 at 6–7.
254. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 26–27 (describing U.S. prosecutions of Colombian narcotics traffickers as a strategy for taking pressure off the Colombian state).
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if Sheku flies into London, and the British will not extradite him to Nigeria
for prosecution, for fear that Sheku will be tortured there.255
This is no surprise. The extraterritorial due process doctrine, as it exists
under current law, is much broader than the reformulated doctrine that this
Article proposes—and all other things being equal, the broader the reach of
the doctrine, the fewer extraterritorial prosecutions there will be. The dynamic is a familiar one. Constitutional criminal rights increase the cost of
prosecutions; because of the Fourth Amendment, for example, police cannot
usually search a house without getting a warrant. The more something costs,
the less we generally buy it. Raising the costs of prosecutions means that we
get fewer prosecutions—but, hopefully, fewer prosecutions means better
prosecutions.256
But in the context of extraterritorial prosecutions, this standard picture
is not the whole one. The United States has mounted hundreds of lethal
drone strikes.257 It seems possible that there are terrorists who were targeted
in U.S. drone strikes in part because federal prosecutors advised they could
not satisfy the extraterritorial due process doctrine with respect to these terrorists—such that U.S. criminal justice was not an alternative option.258
There is now a “strong preference for . . . prosecution of terrorists.”259 But
when that “approach is foreclosed” drone strikes may become an option260—and foreclosing the criminal “approach” is precisely what the extraterritorial due process doctrine sometimes does. Even in the absence of an
actual conflict, due process, as it is conventionally understood under current
law, limits an extraterritorial prosecution. But due process—again, as it is
255. Nongovernmental organizations have described “routine[ ]” use of torture by Nigerian police. Amnesty Int’l, Torture in 2014 at 18 (2014), http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/
default/files/act400042014en.pdf [http://perma.cc/P894-BWXT]. And the global antitorture
treaty, acceded to by the United Kingdom in 1988, prohibits signatories from “extradit[ing] a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture,” and indicates that “a consistent pattern of . . . violations
of human rights” is relevant to that determination. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
256. See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1265, 1274–77 (1999).
257. E.g., Spencer Ackerman, 41 Men Targeted but 1,147 People Killed: US Drone Strikes—
The Facts on the Ground, The Guardian (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147 [http://perma.cc/LA5N-6H5D] (describing
information collected from various sources).
258. See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Terrorism Case Renews Debate Over Drone Hits,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/us/terrorism-case-renewsdebate-over-drone-hits.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/HZ4A-45CT] (describing Obama Administration debate about whether to kill an al Qaeda figure in a drone strike and the eventual
decision to criminally charge him instead).
259. President Barack Obama, Remarks at National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defenseuniversity [https://perma.cc/9NXS-VZGN].
260. Id.
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conventionally understood under current law—does not limit an extraterritorial missile strike.261 This is more than a little ironic—and more perverse,
even, than that.
In a similar vein, one wonders how many alleged terrorists have been
consigned to local prosecutions, off-loaded to terribly rough criminal justice
in Afghanistan or Somalia262—not prosecuted in the incomparably freer and
fairer U.S. courts out of fealty to, of all things, the terrorists’ own rights.
Does consideration of a potential defendant’s fair process rights (as instantiated in the extraterritorial due process doctrine, as currently formulated)
lead to dramatically less in the way of fair process rights for the very same
person?
And the same sorts of questions may be asked of Guantánamo Bay. Civil
libertarians generally argue that Guantánamo detainees should be brought
into the United States for ordinary criminal trials. But it seems possible that
quietly vindicating one of a detainee’s rights (his rights under the extraterritorial due process doctrine, as currently formulated) may ultimately preclude him from being vested with a whole range of other rights. Think of a
Guantánamo Bay detainee whose actions do not reflect any nexus to the
United States. Under the extraterritorial due process doctrine, as it is currently formulated, he cannot be transferred to a federal court in the United
States for a civilian prosecution. And so the detainee may continue to be
held in Guantánamo Bay, where a broad range of constitutional rights do
not apply.263
When it comes to incapacitating ordinary criminals operating inside the
United States, there is essentially only one option, the U.S. criminal justice
system. But when it comes to certain classes of criminals who act extraterritorially—terrorists are the preeminent example—there are other options.
U.S. criminal justice is just one “tool,” to be used (or not) depending on a
261. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (describing as “emphatic” the view that the Fifth Amendment does not apply abroad to protect non-U.S. citizens). An emerging literature suggests that due process rights should be understood to check
all U.S. action, even when undertaken abroad. J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case
Against a Global Constitution, 95 Geo. L.J. 463, 464 (2007). But whatever the merits of that
view, it has not been embraced by the United States, even during the Obama administration.
E.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on the Grounds of Outrageous Government Conduct
at 39–55, United States v. Ghailani, (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010) (No. S10 98 Cr. 1023),
2010 WL 3336021. Note that the extraterritorial due process doctrine seems to be based on the
common-sense assumption that non-U.S. defendants’ due process rights are not potentially
violated abroad, where they acted criminally—but rather in the United States, where they are
being held for trial and tried.
262. U.S. Dep’t of State, Afghanistan 2013 Human Rights Report 3–15 (2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220598.pdf [http://perma.cc/66KC-S24K]
(describing severe systemic problems with respect to defendants’ trial rights); U.S. Dep’t of
State, Somalia 2013 Human Rights Report 2–11 (2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/220370.pdf [http://perma.cc/4XF3-QM3P] (same).
263. See generally Maqaleh v. Hagel, 738 F.3d 312, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Kiyemba v.
Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .
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comparison with other “viable alternatives.”264 If the extraterritorial due
process doctrine takes a U.S. criminal prosecution off the table, the remaining “viable alternatives” may be much less appealing from the perspective of
the very person whose due process rights are being “vindicated.”265
This is what makes the extraterritorial due process doctrine such an odd
piece of constitutional criminal law. The doctrine does not work in the familiar way, protecting the defendant’s rights, even at the cost (to society) of
giving him a “windfall.” Rather, the doctrine protects the defendant’s rights,
at the cost (to him) of taking away what, in the scheme of things, might be a
better option—an American criminal trial. A criminal defendant whose
rights are vindicated might ordinarily expect a benefit—suppression of evidence, for example. But in the context of the extraterritorial due process
doctrine, criminal rights may well point in the opposite direction. Vindicating those rights can harm the hypothesized defendant. As currently formulated, the doctrine is overprotective, extending its protections to no-conflict
cases when there is no basis for doing so—when there is no cognizable unfairness to protect against. In the end, the costs of an overprotective extraterritorial due process doctrine may be real-world underprotection, as people
who might have become U.S. criminal defendants are subjected, by default,
to different, harsher fates. Concerned about a kind of unfairness to defendants that does not much exist, the extraterritorial due process doctrine may,
from the defendant’s perspective, create its own unfairness.
And more than that. All would agree that if Congress and the President
signed on, it would be lawful as a matter of domestic law to attack Syria—to
fire missiles and drop bombs to punish Syria’s chemical weapons use.266 But
imagine that U.S. policymakers wanted an additional option—the filing of
criminal charges against Syrian officials who gassed Syrian civilians,267
charges that would effectively prevent such officials from ever showing up in
London or Lebanon or New York, for vacations or weddings or business
opportunities or retirement, even decades from now, after memories of today’s atrocities may have, tragically, faded. Could such criminal charges be
filed? Probably not. There does not appear to be a tight “nexus” between the
264. Kris, supra note 19, at 12–13.
265. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2392
(1997) (discussing specific and general equilibria in the criminal justice context); Stuntz, supra
note 256, at 1274–77 (describing substitution effects in the criminal justice context).
266. See President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), https:
//www.whitehouse.gov / the-press-office / 2013 / 09 / 10 / remarks-president-address-nation-syria
[https://perma.cc/8DT8-22VN] (stating that, in response to Syrian use of chemical weapons
during August of 2013, “it is in the national security interests of the United States to respond
. . . through a targeted military strike”). See generally Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to
Threaten War, 123 Yale L.J. 1626, 1635–36 (2014) (noting that the congressional power to
declare war “includes the power to authorize limited uses of force short of full-blown war”).
267. See President Barack Obama, supra note 266 (stating that on August 21, 2013 “Asad’s
Government gassed to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children,”
describing this as a “crime against humanity,” and cataloguing evidence that shows that “the
Asad regime was responsible,” including evidence of involvement of “senior figures in Asad’s
military machine”).
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United States and Syria’s use of chemical weapons within Syrian borders.
And so under the extraterritorial due process doctrine as it is currently formulated, it would be difficult for the United States to prosecute Syrians who
used chemical weapons in Syria. Even though the criminal prosecution, like
the hypothesized U.S. attack on Syria, would have the goal of punishing
chemical weapons use. Even though the criminal prosecution would harm
many fewer innocent people than an attack. Even though the hypothesized
criminal prosecution, like the hypothesized attack, would have the support
of the two popular branches, the Congress that passed the relevant criminal
statute and the executive branch that is seeking to enforce it. Even though
the prosecution would not be unfair.
This does not make sense. With the backing of the Congress and the
President, the Constitution allows the United States to act as the world’s
army, enforcing the global norm against chemical weapons use. But even
with the backing of the Congress and the President, the Constitution, as
currently interpreted in the extraterritorial due process doctrine, does not
allow the United States to act as the world’s police force. Distant horrors can
be a casus belli. But under the extraterritorial due process doctrine as it is
currently formulated, distant horrors cannot justify returning an indictment
precisely because of their distance—their lack of connection and “nexus” to
America. The law, I have shown, does not require this result. Truly horrible
actions, like gassing civilians, are universally proscribed. They do not raise
actual conflicts. With respect to legislative jurisdiction, prosecutions of such
actions are limited by policymakers’ decency and humility and good sense.
But not by due process.

